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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
with the experience which the members of a single court of Patent Appeals
would possess or acquire would go far to establish a truly uniform standard
of invention. In view of the confusion which has been caused by new doc-
trinal trend of the Cuno decision and the decisions in the Second Circuit, it
seems that the recommendation of the Commission that a declaration of policy
be enacted to the effect that patentability shall be determined objectively
by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and not sub-
jectively by the nature of the process by which the invention may have been
accomplished, is both timely and desirable, in order that the uncertainty of
inventors and investors may be obviated and the patent system in its time-
tested form be preserved to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
as authorized by the Constitution.
RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONFLICT OF LAws-ImPossBILITY OF COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTE.-The Commissioner of Housings and Buildings of the City of New York
issued an order requiring the plaintiff to vacate a building because he had not complied
with a previous order requiring the installation of a sprinkler system and an interior
fire alarm system in accordance with provisions of the Multiple Dwelling Law.
Plaintiff asserted that because of the regulation of the War Production Board he
could not obtain the material which was necessary to make the prescribed installa-
tions and upon that ground he brought action to enjoin enforcement of the Commis-
sioner's order. Held, injunction granted on the ground that there was a conflict
between state law and federal law and that the latter should prevail in view of
the supremacy clause of the Constitution and also on the ground that to uphold
the Commissioner's order would be an unreasonable and unconstitutional deprivation
of the owner's rights. But as it did not appear that the building would be dangerous
to the tenants, just because the defendant's order could not be complied with, the
State's statutory standard remains in suspended animation. Realty Revenue Cor-
poration v. Wilson, - Misc: --7, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 234, - Sup. Ct. - (1943).
The delegation of wide legislative power1 to subordinate agencies which becomes
necessary in wartime, in order to bring about a quick and effective legislation con-
ceming almost any branch of industry and .commerce is inevitably followed by con-
flicts and frictions between the rules hastily created by these agencies and the laws
and rules already in existence. Therefore a growing number of cases similar .to the
principal case may be expected to be brought into court. Very few precedents, if
any, will be found covering the exact question presented and new law will have
to be declared to cope with this new situation. It might be helpful td clear the field
in advance and to use an opportunity such as the above mentioned case presents.
In the present case the court started with the apodictical statement that there is a
conflict between a federal law and a state law 2 and that in a case like this the federal
rule must prevail in accordance with the provisions of the supremacy clause of the
1. RoTTscirAFER, CONsTITUTIoxAi LAW (1939) 74.
2. N. Y. MULTIPLE DwELLING LAW § 248.
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Federal Constitution.3 The wording of this provision is clear and the court's con-
clusion would be correct, if the premise were right. But is there really a conflict
between federal and state law? Such a conflict may arise in different ways: (1) When
federal powers are employed to regulate matters belonging to the exclusivn com-
petence of the state. (2) When the state invades the realm of exclusive federal legis-
lative power or, (3) finally where Congress and the state legislature have legislated
matters which are subject to the concurrent legislative power of both.4 The conflict
alleged to exist in the principal case is of the third type. But not every divergence
means a conflict, and while it is clear that in case of a true conflict the federal rule
must prevail, it might be different in cases like the one in question. In 'innot v.
Davenport5 the Supreme Court of the United States held that before the supremacy
of an Act of Congress affects a state law which is enacted in the exercise of a re-
served power, the repugnance of conflict must be direct and positive so that the two
acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.8
The distinction between true conflicts and divergencies may sometimes be quite
difficult. The Supreme Court of the United States said in Hines v. Davidowicz:7
"This court in considering the validity of State laws . . . has made use of the
following expressions: Conflicting, contrary to, occupying the field, repugnance, dif-
ference, irreconcilability, inconsistency, violation, curtailment, and interference. But
none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive
constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis there can be no crystal clear distinctly
marked formula."
At least in absence of prohibition by Congress, State legislation will be valid provided
it does not unduly interfere with the realization of the nationar policies intended to
be promoted or safeguarded by the exercise of the power granted to Congress.8 It
would appear to be an oversimplification to say that the sole test of the validity of
state legislation is whether or not it operates in a field in which Congress has like-
wise legislated pursuant to the power granted to that body.9 Difficult as the diagnosis
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, cl. 2.
4. RoTTscnmmRr, CoNsTiTUTIozAL LAW (1939) 88-93.
5. 22 How. 242 (U. S. 1859).
6. See also, Missouri Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 18 Sup. Ct. 488
(1898); U. S. 'v. Tiger, 19 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Tiger v. Shuker, 4 F. (2d)
714 (E. D. Okla. 1925); State .v. White, 170 Ark. 880, 281 S. W. 678 (1928); Washington
Lumber Co. v. McGuire, 177 Ga. 303, 170 S. W. 194 (1931); People v. Board of Education
of the City of Chicago, 349 Ill. 390, 122 N. E. 455 (1932); Town of Brownsbury v. Truck-
sess, 98 Ind. App. 322, 185 N. E. 315 (1933); Waugh v. Shirer, 216 Iowa, 468, 249 N. W.
246 (1933); Dishman v. Coleman, 244 Ky. 239, 50 S. W. (2d) 504 (.1932); Appeal of
Cummings, 126 Me. 111, 136 Atl. 662 (1927); Leitch v. Geither, 151 Md. 167, 134 Ad.
317 (1926); Bugbee v. Mills, 116 L. J. Eq. 59, 172 AU. 203 (1934); Commonwealth v.
Matthews, 303 Pa. 163, 154 Atl. 359 (1931); McHenry v. Humes, 112 W. Va. 432, 164
S. E. 50 (1932).
7. 312 U. S. 52, 67, 61 Sup. Ct. 399 (1940).
8. RoTrsCnHAEaR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 88 et seq.
9. Conway, A State's Power of Defense Under the Constitution (1942) 11 FoannAa L.
REv. 169, 184.
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may be in other cases, in this case it seems to be clear that it was not a true conflict
which was brought before the court but a coincidental friction, as one may call it.
The Multiple Dwelling Law was enacted in exercise of power reserved to the State
and its constitutionality has been established.' 0 The alleged conflict, simply stated,
is that the state law" requires certain devices, protections against fire, to be in-
stalled in plaintiff's building and because of the regulations of the federal agency
the plaintiff cannot procure such devices. There is no "direct and positive repug-
nance"'12 nor are the state law and the federal regulation irreconcilable. In fact there
is no conflict of law at all. The War Production Board in issuing its rules most
probably did not have in mind the provisions of the Multiple Dwelling Law and cer-
tainly the New York Legislature in enacting the provision of the Multiple Dwelling
Law never considered the impossibility of obtaining necessary materials resulting
from the impact of war. It is pure coincidence that to comply with the Multiple
Dwelling Law material is required which the War Production Board refused to
free for this purpose. Purpose and scope of the War Production Board rules and the
Multiple Dwelling Law are completely different and it was by no means the inten-
"tion13 of the War Production Board to upset the Multiple Dwelling Law. In this case
the difficulty arises rather from the practical effect of these rules. If the War Pro-
duction Board regulation had dealt with wooden conduits instead of metal pipes
which a property owner requires, the conflict alleged in this case would not have arisen.
This is not a case of a conflict of laws enacted with the same legislative aim but
here there was a mere coincidence of circumstances which brought about the inter-
section of" these two circles of interests. The case at bar does not present a true
conflict of laws and it would seem that conclusions based upon such an assumption
are erroneous.
After a discussion of cases where laws otherwise perfectly valid had to yield to a
subsequent exertion of Federal legislative power 14 the court returning to the case at
bar states:
"Owners of multiple dwellings may be subjected to uncompensated obedience to
many regulations which are costly and burdensome to them, but to enforce against
them regulations which the Federal Government says they shall not comply with
10. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N. Y. 467, 176 N. E. 705 (1929).
11. N. Y. MuLT ILE DwEmLmo LAW § 248.
12. Repeal of the statute will not be implied unless there is a positive repugnance be-
tween the later and former act. Dial v. Chartman, 70 F. "(2d) 21 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927);
People v. Goldberg, 332 Ill. 346, 163 N. E. 781 (1929) ; Hahn v. Clayton County, 218 Iowa
543, 255 N. W. 695 (1943); State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, 326 Mo. 1233, 34 S. W. (2d)
124 (1930); Commonwealth v. Meyers, 290 Pa.'573, 139 Atl. 374 (1927); Gilbert v.
Lebanon Valley St. Ry., 303 Pa. 43, 150 AtI. 638 (1930); Jacobi v. Clarkson, 60 S. D.
401, 244 N. W. 535 (1932).
13. The question of repeal is one of intention. Curtwright v. Crow, 44 Mo. App. 563,
568 (1891). The presumption is always against the intention to repeal by implication,
where express terms are not used. See Gasconade County v. Gordon, 241 Mo. 569, 145 S. W.
1160 (1912).
14. The state insolvency laws yield to the Federal Bankruptcy Act. See 32 STAT. 840,
11 U. S. C. A. § I et seq.
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would be an unreasonable and unconstitutional deprivation of their rights. State
Commands and Federal prohibitions cannot be allowed to become upper and nether
millstones between which the rights of citizens are ground to bits."
One may admit the court's statement that owner may be subject to/uncompensated
obedience to the exercise of the state's police power but that is about all that can
be admitted. The War Production Board has never by regulation provided that the
plaintiff "shall not comply with the Multiple Dwelling Law." There is a distinct dif-
ference between a mandatory order not to comply, and a regulation which renders
compliance impossible, either in a special case or in an entire category of cases. The
above statement that it would be an unreasonable and unconstitutional deprivation
of the owner's rights seems to be wrong in any direction. The purpose of the Multi-
ple Dwelling Law is obviously to protect the safety and health of the tenants of the
dwelling and, in certain respects, of the entire community. The lack of a sprinkler-
system and a fire-alarm system in dwellings which the legislature in the proper
exercise of the police power has determined should be equipped with them consti-
tuted a continuous danger to those whom the law wishes to protect. For argument's
sake let us assume that in the principal case the danger was immediate and actual.
Would it still be unreasonable and unduly confiscatory to order. the vacation of the
building? Impossibility of compliance does not make the danger less immediate
and actual nor is the danger removed because the plaintiff is willing, but unable, to
get the necessary 'material. Finally it seems to be inappropriate to call the defend-
ant's order "an unconstitutional deprivation of rights." Such a condemnation of the
multiple-dwelling legislation is inconsistent with the general principle recognized by
the court that the state in the proper exercise of the police power may deprive
property owners of the use of their property without compensation.1 5
Suppose the plaintiff could not comply with the Commissioner's order for other
reasons than the War Production Board rules, for instance, because he did not have
the money to buy the necessary material. Would the plaintiff still be entitled to an
injunction on the ground of unconstitutionality? Clearly not. Once the court decided
that the stated provision of the statute was unconstitutional it should have adhered
to it and have held the section of thie Multiple Dwelling Law "unenforcible as long as
the conflict endures" as applied to any case. But the court went on to say "that even
Federal imposed inability to get certain materials cannot justify continued occupa-
tion of dwellings the actual condition of which is such that they- in fact constitute
an actual and immediate menace to life and health." If the Multiple Dwelling Law
is unconstitutional there is no space for this statement in the court's decision. If the
section of the statute is in abeyance or as the court put it "in suspended animation"
the Commissioner should have no right to issue an order to vacate the building even
though it was unsafe.
What should be the law if the court's decision is considered to be wrong? If it
were a contractual obligation the performance of which was prevented by subsequent
legislation the answer would be simple and the way paved by precedents. But this
15. In Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188, 45 Sup. Ct. 264 (1919), the United States
Supreme Court decided that liquor bought at a time when it was perfectly legal to do
so is subject to confiscation by the government without any right of compensation by the
owner, after possession of the liquor became illegal by subsequent legislation.
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is a law-imposed statutory duty. It would be unjust to force the vacation of the build-
ing upon the owner, just because he could not comply with the Commissioner's
order, if it should be found that there is no immediate and actual danger; it would be
equally wrong to suspend the section of the Multiple Dwelling Law generally and
permit the use of a building which is actually dangerous, just because the material
needed to make it safe cannot be' provided for. The situation seems to be beyond
the remedy of the court and calls for a new statute regulating precisely under which
circumstances and conditions the Commissioner should have the right to grant dis-
pensation from the Multiple Dwelling rules. As a matter of fact a statute concern-
ing this matter was already passed by the New York Legislature but vetoed by
the Governor'of the State of New York.16 This case should bring the vetoed act back
for reconsideration.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-TERMLINATION OF TuA.-In the midst
of a trial of the petitioner in the County Court on an indictment charging first degree
manslaughter, the court, pursuant to Section 400 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
discharged the jury, suspended all proceedings, and directed the district attorney to
resubmit the subject-matter of the indictment to the Grand Jury, stating that the
petitioner should have been indicted for murder. The said Section of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that the court may take such steps where it appears by
the testimony that the facts proved constitute a crime higher than that charged
in the indictment. The petitioner was thereafter indicted for murder in the first
degree based upon the same occurrence which supported the manslaughter indict-
ment. The accused obtained a writ of habeas corpus. Held, writ sustained on the
ground that Section 400 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional.
People ex rel. Blue v. Karney, - Misc. -, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 691 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
The doctrine that no one shall twice be put in jeopardy fbr the same offense is
well established in the common law, and constitutional guaranties against double
jeopardy are merely declaratory of the common-law rule.' The provision of the
Constitution of the United States prohibiting a second jeopardy 2 applies only to
16. Assembly bill, Int. No. 859; Senate Reprint No. 2030 proposed a deferment of com-
pliance: "Whenever any duly authorized agency of the Federal Government shall certify
to the department charged with the enforcement of this chapter, that labor or materials ap-
proved by such department and required for compliance of this chapter are unavailable or
.nay not be utilized for such compliance, such compliance shall be deferred until such labor
or materials are available." The bill was passed by the legislature but was vetoed by the
Governor on April 16, 1943, who in his veto message said that: "the existence of the state
of war must not be used as an -excuse for degrading housing standards and the normal
minimum legal precautions for health and safety, except upon a full showing of absolute
necessity. No such showing has been made ... "
1. See People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 413, 417, 17 N. E. 213 (1888).
2. AmEND. V.
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proceedings in federal tribunals and does not bind the several states.8 Whether or not
an accused may twice be placed in double jeopardy in a state criminal prosecution
depends upon the constitutional provision of the particular state.4 The Constitu-
tion of New York State contains a provision similar to that in the United States
Constitution.5
If a jury in a criminal case is discharged in the absence of circumstances render-
ing it proper for the court to exercise discretion in that direction, it will have the
effect of an acquittal. 6 However, the trial court may, in its discretion, discharge the
jury where necessity exists. 7 It was early held in New York that a jury unable to
agree upon a verdict could be discharged by the trial court and a retrial held.8 A
New York statute permitting discharge of the jury and postponement of trial because
of illness of a juror before the conclusion of the trial has been sustained,9 and sim-
ilarly it is proper, where a judge is too ill to appear in court, for another judge of
the same court to declare a mistrial, even in the absence of statute.10 Separation of
the jury without being legally discharged, after the cause has been committed to
them but before they have agreed upon a verdict, furnishes a necessity for the exer-
cise of the power of the court in its discretion to discharge the jury." It was held
that where the accused had been denied his right to a two-day adjournment granted
by statute, the action of the court in discharging the jury for that reason did not
give rise to a sound claim of former jeopardy.' 2 A plea of former jeopardy will not
be sustained where the jury is discharged because of a conversation about the case
between the complaining witness and the foreman of the jury during the progress
of the trial.13
The instances in which the jury can be discharged after they have retired to
consider of their verdict are laid down by statute in New York,14 and in such a
case discharge may be declared only as permitted by the statute.' 5 Contingencies
3. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (U. S. 1847); U. S. v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct.
141 (1922).
4. Palko v. Conn., 302 U. S. 317, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1938). A state statute allowing
appeal by the State in criminal cases for correction of errors of law is consistent with
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Palko v. Conn., supra.
5. N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6.
6. People ex "rel. Totalis v. Craver, 174 Misc. 325, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 533 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
People ex rel. Wright v. Klein, 139 Misc. 353, 248 N. Y. Supp. 478 (Sup. Ct: 1931); State
v. Richardson, 47 S. C. 166, 25 S. E. 220 (1896).
7. U. S. v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U. S. 1824).
8. People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301 (N. Y. 1801); People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns.
'187 (N. Y. 1820).
9. People v. Smith, 172 N. Y. 210, 64 N. E. 814 (1902).
10. People ex rel: Brinkman v. Barr, 248 N. Y. 126, 161 N. E. 444 (1928).
11. People v. Reagle, 60 Barb. 527 (N. Y. 1871).
12. People ex rel. Rosebrough v. Casey, 251 App. Div. 867, 297 N. Y. Supp. 13 (2d
Dep't 1937).
13. People v. Fishman, 64 Misc. 256, 119 N. Y. Supp. 89 (Gen. Sess. 1909).
14. CODE CPara. PROC. § 428.
15. See People ex rel. Brinkman v. Barr, 248 N. Y. 126, 129, 161 N. E. 444 (1928).
19441
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provided for are injury or casualty affecting the defendant, a member of the jury,
or the court, rendering it inexpedient to keep them longer together; inability of the
jury to agree after the lapse of a reasonable time; 16 or when with the leave of the
court the public prosecutor and the counsel for the defendant consent to such dis-
charge. But determination of the necessity for discharge of the jury after commence-
ment of trial and before the case has been submitted to the jury remains within the
sound judicial discretion of the court.17
Statutes similar to Section 400 have been held void in other jurisdictions as deny-
ing to the accused his constitutional protection against double jeopardy.' 8 A different
result was reached under a similar statute where, by virtue of the peculiar wording
of the local constitutional provision, jeopardy could not be held to attach until the
defendant had been acquitted. 19 The general rule, however, is that jeopardy attaches
when a person is put on trial on a valid accusation before a court of competent
jurisdiction and a jury is impaneled and sworn to try the cause.20 As was pointed out
by the court in the principal case, the causes for mistrial which are recognized as
not opposed to the double jeopardy rule arise out of circumstances beyond the
control of the court, whereas the occurrence anticipated by the statute in question
,embraces the purpose of providing greater punishment for the accused.
Section 400 is closely allied in principle to Section 269 of the Penal Law, which
permits conviction for attempt even though it appears on trial that the crime was
consummated, unless the court dismisses the jury and directs that the defendant
be tried for the crime itself. To declare one statute unconstitutional and void is
logically to condemn the other. Although there are cases construing Section 260,21
the question of its constitutionality appears never to have been raised.
CRIMINAL. CONSPIRACY-RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY-IDENTITY OF CONSPIRACY
AND SUBSTANTIVE CIME.-The defendant was tried under an indictment charging
him, among other things, with a conspiracy to receive gasoline ration books stolen
in the County of Queens, situated in the Eastern District of New York, and sold to
the defendant in Manhattan, which is part of the Southern District of New York. A
count of the indictment charging the defendant with the substantive crime of
receiving stolen goods was withdrawn apparently because the act constituting that
crime was committed in the Southern District of New York. Upon appeal from his
16. But the statute does not permit discharge before the jury have declared their in-
ability to agree. People ex rel. Stabile v. Warden, 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911).
17. People ex rel. Herbert v. Hanley, 142 App. Div. 421, 126 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1st
Dep't 1911).
18. State v. Yokum, 155 La. 846, 99 So. 621 (1924); Ingram v. State, 124 Ga. 448, 52
S. E. 759 (1905) ; People v. Hunckeler, 48 Cal. 331 (1874).
19. State v. Buente, 256 Mo. 227, 165 S. W. 340 (1914).
20. People v. Goldfarb, 152 App. Div. 473, 137 N. Y. Supp. 284 (2d Dep't 1912), aff'd,
213 N. Y. 664, 107 N. E. 1083 (1914) ; 1 BisHop, Cgi N¢ LAW (9th ed. 1923) 752.
21. People v. Cosad, 253 App. Div. 104, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 132 (4th Dep't 1938) (statute
applicable only to a trial upon an indictment for an attempt to commit a crime, and not
to a trial upon an indictment for the crime itself) ; People v. Dartmore, 48 Hun. 321, 2 N.
Y. Supp. 310 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
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conviction in the Eastern District of New York, the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the convictiot upon the ground that the indictment was invalid. United
States v. Zeuli, 137 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
The indictment, in so far as it charged the defendant with a conspiracy to receive
stolen goods, was held invalid under the rule that a person cannot be indicted for
a conspiracy to commit a crime which necessarily involves the mutual cooperation
of two- persons. The gist of the crime of conspiracy is the unlawful agreement.1
The agreement is made criminal to prevent unlawful combinations, which in and
of themselves are considered dangerous. 2 Where the substantive offense presupposes
an unlawful combination for its commission, a conspiracy indictment will not lie,
since it results in punishing as two crimes, what is essentially one crime.3
The rule announced in the principal case has been criticized,4 but it has been
consistently applied by state5 and federal courts.6 Although the question has never
been directly passed upon by the Supreme Court, several opinions of that court
contain dicta expressing approval of the doctrine.7 Its exact limitations, ho~vever,
have not as yet been too clearly defined.
Unquestionably, the application of the rule is limited to combinations for the
effectuation of a substantive offense which by definition cannot be committed except
through the participation of at least two persons (concursus necessarius). Adultery,
bigamy, incest, fornication, rioting and dueling are frequently cited as examples of
substantive crimes of this type.8 Other agreements which have been held non-indict-
1. SzAas & WFmozm, MAY's Cnpsmm.L LAW (4th ed. 1938) § 127; Commonwealth
v. Dean, 109 Mass. 349 (1872).
2. Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329, 337 (1807); Hogan v. ONeill, 255 U. S. 52,
41 Sup. Ct. 222 (1921).
3. 2 WmxRTo, CprmanNAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 1604; see Unio Pacific Coal Com-
pany v. U. S., 173 Fed. 737 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900). Even where a conspiracy count %in an
indictment is valid, its abuse for the purpose of increasing the punishment provided for
the substantive crime has been repeatedly criticized, Vannata v. U. S., 289 Fed. 424
(C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Nash v. U. S., 54 F. (2d) 1006 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied,
285 U. S. 556, 52 Sup. Ct. 475.(1932); U. S. v. Anderson, 101 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 7th,
1939), cert. denied, 307 U. S, 625, 59 Sup. Ct. 822 (1939).
4. 2 BISHOP, CRIBSINAL LAw (9th ed. 1923) 129 n. 10. The author, states that the
rule "would overturn the-whole doctrine of attempt." This criticism is hardly tenable. It
apparently assumes that an attempt to commit a crime necessarily involving a combination
of two or more persons could be punishable only as a conspiracy. Such assumption does
not appear to be correct; see People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159 (1859).
5. Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850); Miles v. State, 58 Ala. 390 (1877);
State ex rel. Duerner v. Heugin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046 (1901); State v. Law, 189
Iowa 910, 179 N. W. 145 (1920).
6. U. S. v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 664 (C. C; D. Neb. 1904); U. S. v. New York C. & H. R.
R. R., 146 Fed. 298 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906), aff'd, 212 U. S. 481, 29 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908);
U. S. v. Sager, 49 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); U. S. v. Hagan, 27 Fed. Supp. 814
(W. D. Ky. 1939).
7. U. S. v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140, 144, 35 Sup. Ct. 271 (1915); U. S. v. Katz, 271
U. S. 354, 355, 46 Sup. Ct. 513 (1926) ; Gebardi v. U. S., 287 U. S. 112, 123, 53 Sup. Ct. 35
(1932).
8. State v. Law, 189 Iowa 910, 179 N. W. 145 (1920).
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able are those between the giver and the receiver of a bribe,9 between the giver
and the receiver of a rebate illegal under the Interstate Commerce Act,' 0 and between
a fugitive from justice and a person concealing him." On the other hand, appli-
cation of the rule has been uniformly denied where the substantive offense could
have been committed by one of the participants acting alone, that is, the co-opera-
tion of the several participants was not logically necessary for the commission
of the substantive crime (concursus facudtativus). Thus, indictments and convictions
have been upheld for conspiracies to certify a check in the absence of sufficient
funds,12 to smuggle and to defraud the customs,' 3 to cause delivery of intoxicating
liquor by a common carrier to a fictitious person 14 and to cause the transport of
intoxicating liquor into a prohibition state.15 Where concert of action is not
logically necessary for the commission of the substantive offense, the* doctrine is
inapplicable even if the substantive offense could not practically be completed with-
out the co-operation of all the participants. Thus, convictions for conspiracy were
upheld where several newspaper publishers co-operated to bring about an injury
to the business of a third party which could practically not be effected by any one
of said publishers acting alone1 6 and, similarly, where partners conspired to file
a false income tax return for the partnership.' 7 Moreover, it has been stated that
a conspiracy indictment may be sustained where it alleges an agreement to commit,
in addition to the substantive crime logically requiring concert of action, another
offense capable of being committed by one of the conspirators.' 8 As a matter of
fact in the principal case the indictment alleged a conspiracy not only to receive
stolen goods but also to steal them, but the court held that the evidence did not
connect the receiver with the actual theft.19 Of course, if the indictment merely
alleges an agreement to commit a substantive crime not logically requiring concert
of action, it is not defective simply because the proof shows that the agreement also
included. an offense requiring a combination of the conspirators for its commission.20
9. U. S. v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 664 (C. C. D. Neb. 1904) ; U. S. v. Sager, 49 F. (2d) 725
(C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
10. U. S. v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 146 Fed. 298 (C. C. S. D. N. Y, 1906),
aff'd, 212 U. S. 481, 29 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908).
11. U. S. v. Hagan, 27 Fed. Supp. 813 (W. D. Ky. 1939).
12. Chadwick v. U. S., 141 Fed. 225, 236 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905).
13. U. S. v. Shevlin, 212 Fed. 343 (Mass. 1913).
14. McKnight v. U. S., 252 Fed. 687, 689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
15. Laughter v. U. S., 259 Fed. 94 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919).
16. State ex rel. Duerner v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 243, 85 N. W. 1046 (1901).
17. Lisansky v. U. S., 31 F. (2d) 846 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
18. U. S. v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 355, 46 Sup. Ct. 513 (1926). In this case the indictment
charged conspiracy to sell liquor illegally without making a record ofthe sale. The court
held that since the defendants were buyer and seller, conspiracy to commit the crime of
illegally selling would not lie, and that the government's attempt to avoid this objection
by including in the conspiracy an agreement not to record the sale failed since the latter
substantive offense could only be committed by an authorized dealer in liquor.
19. The court held that mere knowledge of the theft would not make the receiver
a party to the conspiracy to steal, citing U. S. v. Falcone, 311 U. S. 205, 61 Sup. Ct.
204 (1940).
20. U. S. v. Burke, 221 Fed. 1014 (S. D. N. Y. 1915). In this case the indictment
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The doctrine that no conspiracy will lie where the act agreed upon logically
requires concert of action by at least two persons remains applicable even though
three or more persons participate in the agreement, provided the understanding and
the act of the several persons do not involve anything more than is necessary for
the commission of the substantive crime. 21 However, it can he reasoned that a
point may be reached where the size of the combination and the resulting increase
in danger to the public becomes so formidable as to warrant a restriction upon
the doctrine.22 Of course, where a person, in addition to those logically required
for the commission of the substantive offense, participates merely in the combina-
tion and not in the substantive offense, that additional person and his conspirators
are punishable for the conspiracy. For example, where a man and woman who
were to commit the crime of adultery, agreed with a third person who was to aid
and abet them in their crime, all were held" guilty of conspiracy.p A fortiori where
the woman does not participate in the conspiracy, the male accomplices may be
guilty of conspiracy. 24 Along a similar line of reasoning it has been held, that,
although an officer of a corporation may not alone form an unlawful combination
between himself and his corporation by his thoughts and acts within the scope
of his agency without the knowledge or participation of any other agent or officer
of the corporation, 25 two corporations and their presidents may be guilty of com-
bining in violation of the Anti-Trust Act, on the ground that the corporation might
have done some things and the individuals other things which were utterly different
but all of which dovetailed together to produce an unlawful combination.2 6
Where pursuant to an agreement two persons co-operate actively in committing
a crime upon one of them as a victim, they may be guilty of conspiracy. For
example, it has been held that a woman may conspire to procure an abortion upon
herself when under the law she could not commit the substantive crime and, there-
fore, could not be an accomplice.2 7 Similarly, where a woman actively participated
alleged a conspiracy to defraud the United States and the proof indicated that the defraud-
ing was to be accomplished by bribery.
21. U. S. v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 146 Fed. 298 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906),
aff'd, 212 U. S. 481, 29 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908); U.'S. v. Sager, 49 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931). In the principal case the indictment for conspiracy was held to be invalid al-
though the thief had dealt with several receivers who apparently had not cooperated
with one another.
22. See Note (1905) 20 HARv. L. REV. 62.
23. State v. Clemenson, 123 Iowa 524, 99 N. W. 139 (1904). Also see Thomas v.
U. S., 156 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), where the defendants were held to be irre-
sponsible intermediaries between givers and takers of a rebate and hence indictable for
conspiracy, in which respect the case is distinguishable from U. S. v. New York C. & H. R.
R. R., 146 Fed. 298 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906), aff'd, 212 U. S. 481, 29 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908),
where the defendants actually represented the givers and takers of a rebate.
24. State v. Reiners, 80 N. J. L. 196, 76 Ad. 330 (1910).
25. Union Pacific Coal Co. v. U. S., 173 Fed. 737 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900).
26. U. S. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906).
27. Solander v. People, 2 Colo. 48 (1873); State v. Crofford, 133 Iowa 478, 110 N. W.
921 (1907). In Queen v. Whitchurch [1890) 24 Q. B. D. 420 a woman, erroneously
believing herself pregnant, was held guilty of conspiracy with those who attempted to
procure an abortion upon her, even though under the statute a woman not being with
child would not be punishable for the substantive offense.
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in an agreement for her own transportation across a state line ih violation of the
Mann Act she was held guilty of the conspiracy, although she is not punishable
under the Act. 28
For somewhat similar reasons, it has repeatedly been decided that the doctrine
precluding conspiracy does not apply, although the substantive offense presupposes
a concert of action, if the law defining the substantive offense provides no punish-
ment for one of the necessary participants. Thus, conspiracy convictions have
been upheld: for an agreement between an employee of a railroad company and
one who receives a free ticket for the use of another in violation of the Hepburn
Act which provides penalties only for the railroad company and the user of the free
tickets;29 for an agreement to give illegal rebates on passenger fares because under
the applicable statute only the giver, not the receiver of the rebate was punishable;30
and for an agreement involving the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor where only
the seller, but not the buyer, was subject to a penalty under the statute.31 In the
broad formulation given to this limitation of the doctrine by some of the decisions,
it leads frequently to rather unsatisfactory results3 2 and does not seem to be
sound. A decision holding an indictment for a conspiracy to commit adultery to
be invalid in a State in which only the married party is punishable for the substantive
crime may be pointed to as reaching a sounder result, because the decision does
not test the validity of the indictment merely by the fact that both parties are
punishable.33
If conspiracy would lie in all cases where one of the parties to the agreement
is not punishable for the substantive offense, the invalidation of the indictment in
the principal case would be open to question. True, the opinion contains language
to the effect that both the defendant receiver of the stolen goods and the thief
from whom the goods were received were guilty of the substantive crime, but the
Federal Criminal Code34 is silent on the question whether the thief is guilty as an
accomplice to the crime of receiving the stolen goods and no decision of a federal
court on this point has been found. Only a minority of the states, however, holds
that the thief is punishable for the necessary part he is playing in the commission
28. U. S. v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140, 35 Sup. Ct. 271 (1915).
29. U. S. v. Clark, 164 Fed. 75 (W. D. Mo. 1908).
30. U. S. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 225 Fed. 283 (W. D. N. Y. 1915).
31. Vanata v. U. S., 289 Fed. 424, 427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
32. In Vanata v. U. S., 289 Fed. 424, 428-429 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), Hough, J., made
this trenchant observation in upholding a conviction of a seller and buyer of liquor for
conspiracy to violate the Volstead Act which makes it criminal to sell intoxicating liquor:
"... we still maintain misgivings as to the justice of the proceeding. .. . If any right-
minded layman of intelligence were told to read section 29 of the Volstead Act, he would
think he knew just what it meant to sell whiskey. If counsel learned in the law then
tol i him that it was optional with the prosecutor to utilize section 37 of the Criminal
Code [the conspiracy statute] to quadruplicate the penalty, he would incline to think of
schoolbook 'information as to how certain tyrants put their laws on pillars so high that
plain citizens could not mark, learn and inwardly digest the same."
33. Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850), when read in connection with
Helfrich v. Commonwealth, 33 Pa. 68 (1859).
34. 35 STAT. 1098, 18 U. S. C. A. § 101 (1908).
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of the crime of receiving stolen goods35 and in most of the state jurisdictions
the thief is not considered guilty as an accomplice of the receiver.3 0 New York,
which used to belong to the minority, 7 has adopted the majority view by statute.38
It is submitted that the doctrine relied upon by the court in the principal case is
applicable and that conspiracy for the receiving of stolen goods will not lie whether
the law governing the substantive crime punishes both the thief and the receiver
or the receiver alone.
The true limits of the doctrine, it would appear, are to be found in each case by
ascertaining to what extent the law which defines the substantive crime is intended
to punish the participants, or either of them, to the exclusion of punishment under
the conspiracy statutes. Where the law pertaining to the substantive crime provides
a punishment for both necessary participants it can be presumed that the law's
disposition is meant to be exclusive and there is no room for a punishment for
conspiracy. 9 And the same must be true where, under the law of the substantive
offense, one of the necessary parties is not punishable even for intentional acts. °
Finally, where the law which'is applicable to the substantive offense provides for
the punishment of only one of the necessary participants without expressly or
impliedly dealing with the other, it must in each case be ascertained to what extent
and under which circumstances it was intended that such second party be left free
of punishment. In reversing the conspiracy conviction of a woman who had con-
sented passively to her own transportation across a: state line in violation of the
Mann Act, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the court "perceived
in the failure of the Mann Act to condemn the woman's participation in those
transportations which are effected with her mere consent evidence of an affirmative
legislative policy to leave her acquiescence unpunished." 41 Although the Supreme
Court in that ase expressly refused to rest its decision upon the doctrine that
conspiracy does not l e where concert of action is logically necessary to commit
the crime, the decision is, nevertheless, believed to be. a correct and practical appli-
cation of the samebasic rule, namely, that where the law accords a certain name
and punishment to a combination of two or more persons to effect a particular
criminal end, such combination cannot be called by a different name to avoid the
limits of the punishment.
One more controversy with respect to the doctrine under consideration may merit
a brief discussion. The statement of the doctrine in the opinion of the instant case
implies that it is applicable only if the logically necessary participants have in fact
committed the substantive crime.42 There i4 considerable authority to the effect
35. Commonweal th v. Savory, 10 Cush. 535 (Mass. 1852); Cohn v. People, 197 Ill.
482, 64 N. W. 306 (1902).
36. Springer v. State, 102 Ga. 447, 30 S. E. 971 (1897) ; State v. Jones, 115 Iowa 113,
88 N. W. 196 (1901); State v. Gordon, 105 Minn. 217, 117 N. W. 483 (1908).
37. People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N. Y. 463, 143 N. E. 256 (1924).
38. N. Y. Penal Law § 1308a.
39. U. S. v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 664 (C. C. D. Neb. 1904); U. S. v. Sager, 49 F. (2d)
725 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
40. See note 33 supra.
41. Gebardi v. U. S., 287 U. S. 112, 53 Sup. Ct. 35 k1932).
42. U. S. v. Zieuli, 137 F. (2d) 845, 846 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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that conspiracy lies even in cases where the agreement is directed to the commission
of a substantive crime logically requiring concerted action by all the participants
to the agreement provided that the substantive crime has in fact not been con-
summated.43 This view appears to consider the present doctrine as an outgrowth
of the common law merger theory under which a conspiracy punishable as a mis-
demeanor and directed to the commission of a felony merged into the consummated
greater crime. The merger theory itself is being gradually abandoned. 4 It is not
applied in the federal courts 45 and has been expressly repudiated in New York.
46
The present rule, however, is actually not a part of the merger doctrine47 but
rests upon different and independent considerations pointed out above. It is be-
lieved that these considerations, and therefore the doctrine itself, are applicable
whether or not the substantive offense has been consummated. In fact, several
decisions have quashed indictments for conspiracy on the ground that the substantive
crime, which had been intended but not completed, could be committed only by
a logically necessary concert of action of all the participants to the agreement 848
CRIMINAL LAw-HoMICIDE-PROXIMATE CAUSE.-Defendant was indicted for first
degree manslaughter, and having been granted permission to inspect the grand jury
minutes, moved to dismiss the indictment upon the ground that the evidence before
the grand jury was insufficient to support the indictment. That evidence disclosed that
the defendant, while driving his automobile along a rural highway, had asked a girl,
eighteen years of age, who was walking along the highway, if she wanted a ride.
The girl said she was going only a short distance, but defendant persuaded her to
get into the car, and almost immediately thereafter, when the car had attained a
speed of twenty-five miles an hour, the defendant offered the girl one dollar to have
sexual intercourse with him. The girl immediately opened the door of the car, hesi-
tated a moment, and jumped. Her skull was fractured in the fall and she died. There
was no evidence that the defendant had done anything except make the proposal.
Held, the proposal was a felony and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the in-
dictment. People v. Goodman, - Misc. -, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 715 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
The court's conclusion that the proposal made by the defendant to the deceased
was a felony was placed upon the ground that it is a felony in New York to "induce,
entice or procure, or attempt to induce, entice or procure any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or concubinage, or for any other immoral purpose."' It has
43. McKnight v. U. S., 252 Fed. 687, 689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); also see 2 WHARTON,
CRIami.L LAW (12th ed. 1932) 1604.
44. 2 WHARTON, CRunrNA. LAW (12th ed. 1932) 1611.
45. Heike v. U. S., 227 U. S. 131, 144, 33 Sup. Ct. 226 (1913); U. S. v. Rabinovich,
238 U. S. 78, 35 Sup. Ct. 682 (1915).
46. People v. Tavormina, 257 N. Y. 84, 177 N. E. 317 (1931).
47. Lisansky v. U. S., 31 F. (2d) 846 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Vannata v. U. S., 289
Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
48. Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850); Miles v. State, 58 Ala. 390 (1877).
1. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2460, subd. 3: "Any person who shall induce, entice or procure any
woman or girl, or attempt to induce, entice or procure any woman or girl for the purpose
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already been pointed out by a New York court that this is an incomplete statement
of any facts which would constitute a crime.2 The language in the statute relied
upon by the court is divorced from its context and makes sense only when the entire
provision is read.3 Read as a whole, the provision has been construed as referring
to an enticement to compulsory prostitution and as not directed at an isolated instance
of vice. 4 It would, therefore, appear that the defendant's solicitation of the deceased
in itself did not constitute a crime,5 except, possibly, disorderly conduct. 6
If the defendant's wrongful act did constitute a crime and was the legal cause of
the girl's death, there is still some question whether an indictment for first degree
manslaughter would be justified. The only provision of the New York Penal Law
defining that crime which could possibly apply to the defendant's act is the one in-
cluding within the definition of that crime an unintentional homicide "by a person
engaged in committing or attempting to commit, a misdemeanor, affecting the person
... of the person killed."7 In People v. Grieco,8 the Court of Appeals restricted the
application of this provision of the manslaughter statute to misdemeanors intention-
ally directed at the person killed, 9 and applied by analogy (even though the court
admitted that the analogy was not complete) 10 the merger doctrine which obtains
in New York in the case of felony murder." If the defendant's act of solicitation is
of prostitution or concubinage, or for any other immoral purpose, or to enter any house of
prostitution in this state shall be deemed guilty of a felony.. . "
2. People v. Rogers, 183 App. Div. 604, 606, 170 N. Y. Supp. 825 (1st Dep't 1918).
3. See note i supra.
4. People v. Draper, 169 App. Div. 479, 490, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1034 (3d Dep't 1915), in
which the court reached the above conclusion by considering the history of the statute and
dropping out the last conjunctive "or" in the third subdivision of the statute; see note 1
supra; also see, People v. Odierno, 166 Misc. 108, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 99 (Co. Ct. 1938).
5. There is no general crime of solicitation in New York, HALL & GLuEcx, CAsxs AxD
MATERIALS ON CRnnNAL LAW (1940) 485. If the girl had been under eighteen years of
age, the defendant might have committed attempted second degree (statutory) rape. N. Y.
PENAL LAW § 2010. Since the evidence did not disclose that the defendant made any physi-
cal move toward the deceased, it is even questionable that this crime would have been com-
mitted; see Strahorn, Preparation For Crime As A Criminal Attempt (1939) 1 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1, 12.
6. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 43. This is a "catch-all" provision which declares to be a mis-
demeanor, among other things, "any act ...which openly outrages public decency, for
which no other punishment is expressly prescribed by this chapter. . . ." See People v.
Tylkoff, 212 N. Y. 197, 105 N. E. 835 (1914) ; People ex rel. Prudhomme v. Superintendent
21 N. Y. S. (2d) 563 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
7. N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1050, subd. 1. The fact that the act of the defendant might
have constituted a felony (which, as pointed out above, it did not), and hence the basis
for felony murder (N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1044, subd. 2) would not seem to prevent its use
as the basis for first degree manslaughter; People v. Stacy, 119 App. Div. 743, 104 N. Y.
Supp. 615 (3d Dep't 1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 577, 85 N. E. 1114 (1908); see also, N. Y.
PENAL LAw § 610.
8. 266 N. Y. 48, 193 N. E. 684 (1934).
9. Id. at 51.
10. Id. at 53.
11. People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y.
1944]
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to be deemed a misdemeanor directed against the person of the defendant, it might
be argued that it partakes of the nature of an assault and should be merged in the
homicide, if the dictum to that effect in People v. Grieco represents a correct state-
ment of the law.' 2
If the defendant's act, which is alleged to have caused the girl's death, was not a
crime, it is difficult to see upon what basis the defendant could be charged with first
degree manslaughter.13 Assuming legal causation, he might be guilty of second degree
manslaughter. 14 In some jurisdictions, the defendant's guilt would depend upon
whether his act of solicitation was malum in se as distinguished from malum pro-
hibitum,15 but in New York the provisions of the Penal Law alone control. 16 Never-
thelesi, assuming for purposes of discussion that the act which is alleged to have
caused the death was criminal, the interesting question remains whether the act was
the proximate, that is the legal, cause of the death.
It is clear that fright may be the means whereby a person kills another, just as
much as stabbing or shooting, and convictions have been sustained, ,where the violent
conduct of the defendant, intentionally directed at the deceased, has frightened him
to death.17 There are even some which have gone to the extreme of 'holding a
defendant criminally responsible for the death of another caused by fright which
100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927); Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York (1937) 6 FoRwM L.
REv. 43, 46.
12. It has been held, contrary to the dictum in People v. Grieco, that the merger doctrine
does not apply to manslaughter occurring during commission of a misdemeanor, People
v. Stacy, 119 App. Div. 743, 104 N. Y. Supp. 615 (3d Dep't 1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 577,
85 N. E. 114 (1908). The practical reason for the origin of the merger doctrine as applied
to felony murder, was to preserve the distinction between the degree of murder and be-
tween murder and manslaughter, Corcoran, supra note 10, at 47, 48. Such reason does not
appear to exist in the case of manslaughter.
13. "Since the courts neither take cognizance of all moral wrong nor punish every
remote injury to the community, the evil of each combination of act and intent must be
measured in two ways to determine whether it is punishable or not. The one is by its
nature, and the other is by its magnitude. That the magnitude of the thing as well as its
nature must be considered results from the plainest principles of reason and justice. For,
if it were not, the courts would undertake to exercise in one direction the full supervision
of the Deity over men, contrary to what is either practical or beneficial." 1 BisHop, Ca-e-
INAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) 150.
14. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1052, which includes in subd. 1 an unintentional killing "by a
person committing or attempting to commit a trespass, or other invasion of a privateright
• .. of the person killed ... " No reported decision appears to have construed this sub-
division of the statute.
15. State v. Horton, 139 N. C. 588, 51 S. E. 945 (1905); Commonwealth v. Mink,
123 Mass. 422 (1877); Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Unlawful
Act (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 811, 830; Note, The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita
and Mala in Se in Criminal Law (1930) 30 CoL. L. Rxv. 74.
16. N. Y. PENAr. LAW § 22 provides: "No act or omission ... shall be deemed criminal or
punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this chapter or by some statute of this
state not repealed by it."
17. Cox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500 (1880); Regina v. Dugal, 4 Quebec L. R. 350 (1878);
see Commonwealth v. Wing, 9 Pick 1 (Mass. 1823).
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has resulted from the violent act of the defendant not directed at the deceased.18 The
question in the principal case, as the court recognized, is narrower, since the girl
in the principal case did not die as the direct result of her fright but as the result
of her act of jumping from the car which was alleged to have been caused by her
fright. It seems to be well established that a defendant may be criminally respon-
sible for the death of another where the other meets death in an attempt to escape
the defendant's threatened violence. However, before the law will trace the chain of
physical causation from the defendant's wrongful act to the death it must be shown
that there was a well grounded apprehension of physical violence.19
The New York Constitution provides that no one can be tried for a felony except
upon an indictment by a grand jury,20 and a conviction under such an indictment
must be supported by evidence that the defendant committed the act alleged in the
indictment and not by proof of some other act, even though the act prove.d might
also be criminal.2 ' There was, therefore, presented to the court in the principal case
a pure question of law: Could the act alleged in the indictment constitute the legal
cause of the girl's death?2 2 Whether the defendant's alleged act, if proved, did
in fact cause the girl to jump would, of course, be a question for the trial jury, whose
finding on that question would be conclusive.23 The court gave an affirmative answer
to the question, for the court held that a "jury might say that deceased was placed in
18. Regina v. Towers, 12 Cox, C. C. 530 (Eng. 1874), where the defendant assaulted
a nurse, who had a four-year old infant in her arms. The infant became greatly alarmed and
thereafter had convulsions, suffered from shock and died a month later. This decision is
characterized as "a questionable extreme" and criticized in 1 WmmrTON, CpmnNA LAW
(12 ed. 1932) 273, 274. In Ex parte Heigho, 18 Idaho 566, 110 Pac. 1029 (1910) the defend-
ant had gone to the home of B, armed with a pistol, and without provocation had struck B
in the face with his fist. Bs mother-in-law saw the assault and the excitement caused her
to die of an aneurism in the -heart. The defendant was held on a charge of manslaughter
and attempted to secure his release by a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was quashed. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Couch, 32 Ky. 638, 106 S. W. 830 (1908).
19. Regina .v. Pitts, 1 Carr & M, 284, 274 Eng. Rep. Repr. 509 (1842); Hendrickson v.
Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 281, 3 S. W. 166 (1887); State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477 (1859);
State v. Preslar, 48 N. C. 421 (1856) ; Adams v. People, 109 Ill. 444 (1884).
20. N. Y. CONST. Art I, § 6.
21. People v. Dunar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887); see People v. Bogdanoff, 254
N. Y. 16, 171 N. E. 890 (1930) ; People v. Hines, 284 N. Y. 93, 29 N. E. (2d) 483 (1940).
22. "The rule that requires the exclusion of remote consequence is therefore a funda-
mental principle of law, based on the necessity of doing justice to all; and the question
in any particular case, whether a given result is remote, is purely a question of law. This
of course does not mean that the jury has no part in the determination of the question,
which always involves the application of the law to facts, often quite complex. Particularly
where the defendant's connection with the result is on the passive side the determination
of the question involves the settlement of inferences of fact which are seldom so clear that
the court can take the question away from the jury. But the rule of law which is to be
applied to the facts must always be found by the court and given by it to the jury."
Beale, The Proximate Consequences of An Act (1920) 33 HMv. L. REv. 633, 640.
23. N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 420; People w Walker, 198 N. Y. 329, 91 N. E. 806
(1910).
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substantial apprehension of danger by defendant's criminal act in the circumstances
that surrounded her.")24
,The function which the court was called upon to discharge in answering the
legal question presented involved the determination of questions which the words of
the criminal statute .and, to a great extent, the precedents, do not altogether answer.
25
For instance, an important consideration, it would seem, in determining the crim-
inal responsibility of the defendant in the principal case, was the standard to be
applied in judging not only the defendant's conduct but that of the deceased. If,
upon the trial, the jury should find that the deceased was a hypersensitive or an
easily frightened person, should that fact be disregarded on the theory that -the de-
fendant takes his victim as he finds her?26 Or, upon the contrary, should the court
have held, in determining whether the girl's act ,was voluntary or involuntary in
the eyes of the law, that her act of jumping from the car must be judged by the
standard of conduct of the average person, circumstanced as was the deceased?
2 7
On this particular point the court's opinion is not entirely clear, for while in one part
of its opinion 28 the court says: "Her apprehension would necessarily be examined
from her viewpoint at the time and considered in the light of her action," in another
part of its opinion, 29 the court remarks that "a jury could find from these facts
that she acted reasonably for her own safety under the force of substantial appre-
hension of immediate danger suggested by an outrageous proposal." It is submitted
that, despite this slight inconsistency in the court's language, the ultimate conclusion
reached by the court on the question of legal cause is sound. Support for the court's
conclusion may be derived by analogy from the law of torts, in which the better
rule seems to be that: "An act done by another in normal response to fear or emo-
tional disttirbance to which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in
subjecting the other is not a superseding cause of harm done by the other's act to
himself or a third person."30 The word "normal" is here used as the opposite of
"highly extraordinary" and not in its more customary sense of "standard" or
"usual," 31 nor does it mean that the act must be reasonable.3 2
24. People v. Goodman, - Misc. -, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 715, 718 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
25. See GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXImATE CAUSE (1927) 38, 56, 66, 75.
26. State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 96 S. W. (2d) 707 (1936); see other cases collected
in Notes (1914) 51 L. R. A. (N. s.) 577.
27. Hendrickson v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 281, 3 S. W. 166 (1887). McLaughlin, Proxi-
mate Cause (1925) 39 HARv. L. REV. 149, 169, 170 in referring to an article written by
Professor Beale (see note 22 supra) says: "In all of the cases that Professor Beale puts as
illustrative of this type of proximate causation, where defendant stimulates another person
to do something, the action has some reasonable reference to the necessities of the situation
produced by the defendant. The action of the second party is within the scope of what is
called for by the situation created by the defendant's active force... Uncalled for action
is not proximately caused by the defendant."
28. - Misc. -, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 715, 718 (1943).
29. Id. at -, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) at 716; italics added.
30. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 444.
31. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 443, comment 6.
32. "If after the event, and knowing that the fear or disturbance has been created, the
act done under its impulsion appears highly extraordinary it is not a normal response to
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Finally, another approach to the problem has been suggested, namely, that even
where the defendant's act has in fact caused the death, "its punishability as a homi-
cide should be determined, not so much by the more or less fortuitous course of
events subsequent to the acting, as by the, actual menace of the act, and the vicious-
ness of the actor's intent."33 Even applying this test, one would hesitate to quarrel
with the court's conclusion.
FAiR LABOR STANDARDS AcT-ARBrrRATION OF EMPLOYEES' Surrs.-Plaintiff brought
a class action on behalf of himself and other employees against defendant employer,
which operated a coal mine, to recover amounts alleged to be due them for overtime
work pursuant to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Defendant
filed an application for a stay of the action on the ground that the United States Arbi-
tration Act of 1925 applied to the alleged claim by virtue of the following arbitra-
tion. clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement:
"Any difficulty or disagreement . . . either as to . . . interpretation or application
or in any way growing out of the relations of employers and employed, which can-
not be settled or adjusted by consultation . . . shall be referred to a permanent joint
committee to be called a Board of Conciliation ....
The District Court denied the application for a stay. Upon appeal, held, that a stay
would be granted, since the quoted clause of the collective bargaining agreement was
broad enough to include a controversy relating to overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F. (2d) 3
(C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
The United States Arbitration Act of 19251 closely parallels the New York statute, 2
which before it was amended in 1940, was construed not to include a dispute as to
wages between an employer and a labor-union.3 The amendment to the New York
statute4 extended arbitration to include employment contracts. However, the New
the fear of disturbance. Thus, if some unknown idiosyncrasy of a particular individual is
the cause of the defendant's conduct putting him in feaf or subjecting him to any other
emotion, the fear or emotion may be regarded as so extraordinary a result as to make it
improper to hold the actor responsible for harm caused by acts done under its impulsion.
On the other hand, it is not necessary that the actor's conduct should be such as to create
the fear and emotion in a man of average firmness and poise. There are large groups of
persons of such recognized emotional instability as to make it normal for them to feel
strong emotions under circumstances which ivould not so affect the average of nankind."
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 444, comment c.
33. Comment (1933) 31 MicH. L. Rxv. 659, 663; see Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141,
179 N. E. 633 (1932).
1. 43 STAT. 883, 9 U. S. C. A. §§ 1, et seq. (1925).
2. N. Y. Crv. PRac. AcT, Art. 84; see Grassmaft, Trade Security Under Arbitra-
tion Laws (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 308, 318; Cohen and Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration
Law (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 269.
3. Matter of Buffalo & Erie Ry. Co., 250 N. Y. 275, 165 N. E. 282 (1929).
4. N. Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 1448.
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York courts still refuse to compel arbitration where the cause of action arises under
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
5
The provision of the United States Arbitration Act immediately following the
enactment clause6 gives to "commerce" its traditional definition 7 and excludes from
the coverage of the Act "contracts of employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce." 8 While this provision seems to constitute a definite limi-
tation on the operation of the entire act,9 the limitation was not discussed either in
the opinion of the District Court' ° or of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the principal
case. Both courts apparently assumed that the collective bargaining agreement did
not evidence "a transaction involving commerce." An arbitration provision in such
an agreement is declared to be valid and enforceable by the second section of the
Act." The third section of the Act provides for a stay in a suit brought in a fed-
eral court "upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing
for such arbitration"' 2 and the discussion of the provision of the United States Arbi-
tration Act in both courts was only concerned with the question whether a stay
under § 3 might be granted under an arbitration clause contained in a contract
not within the purview of § 2, i.e., one which did not evidence "a transaction involv-
ing commerce." On this issue the Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the District
Court, decided that a stay might be granted under § 3, even where the contract con-
taining the arbitration clause was not within the purview of § 2, since in the court's
opinion the provisions of § 2 were not intended to limit the court's power to grant
a stay under § 3.13
S. Matter of City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 179 Misc. 770, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 842 (Sup.
Ct. 1943); Garrity v. Bagold Corp., 180 Misc. 120, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 257 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ;
McClintock v. Garment Center Capital, Inc., - Misc. - , - N. Y. S. (2d) - (Stp. Ct.
1943), N. Y. L. J., Oct. 21, 1943, p. 1022, col. 6,.in which the court expressly refused to
subscribe to the determination in the principal case.
6. This provision will hereafter be referred to as 1 1 of the Act, as it- is in the United
States Code Annotated. The statute as enacted [43 STAT. 883, 9 U. S. C. A. § 1, et seq.
(1925)], which will be found in the marginal notes to Marine Transit Co. v. Dreylus,
284 U. S. 263, 270-273, 52 Sup. Ct. 166 (1932), does not number this opening provision,
nor does it contain the section heading found in the United States Code Annotated, which
reads "'Maritime transactions' and 'commerce' defined; exceptions to operation of title."
7. 43 STAT. 883, 9 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1925) defines commerce as meaning "commerce
among the several States. .... "
8. 43 STAT. 883, 9 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1925); KELLER, ARBITRATION IN ACTION (1941) 68, in
discussing controversies subject to arbitration, says: "Labor arbitrations are not so for-
tunately placed. The United States Arbitration Law and the statutory laws of Arizona,
California, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wisconsin,
specifically exclude labor controversies." Also see 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936)
5368, n. 18.
9. See note 6 supra and The Volsino, 32 Fed. (2d) 357 (E. D. N. Y. 1929) ; In re Cold
Metal Process Co., 9 Fed. Supp. 992 (W. D. Pa. 1935).
10. 49 Fed. Supp. 843 (M. D. Pa. 1943).
11. 43 STAT. 883, 9 U. S. C. A. § 2 (1925).
12. 43 STAT. 883, 9 U. S. C. A. § 3 (1925).
13. The court was of the opinion that § 3 was enacted as a rule of adjective law gov-
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Since both courts assumed that the collective bargaining agreement did not evi-
dence a transaction involving interstate commerce, the limitation in § 1 of the Act,
excluding from its coverage employment contracts of interstate workers, was ap-
parently considered not to apply. The exact nature of the employment of the plaintiff
and the other employees whom he represented is not stated in the opinions of either
court. If they were coal miners, it might well be maintained that they were engaged
in .interstate commerce.' 4 Assuming that the collective bargaining agreement-under
which arbitration was sought is to be treated as a contract of employment, it might
further be argued that the subject matter of the arbitration is excluded from the
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act by its express terms upon the ground that the
agreement deals with employees engaged in "interstate commerce" as that term
is used in that Act. So far as the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act are
concerned, employees such as coal miners might not be considered as engaged "in
interstate commerce" but rather "in the production of goods for commerce." The
Fair Labor Standards Act draws this distinction.15 However; because the expression
"in commerce" is accorded a certain meaning in one congressional enactment, it does
not follow that the same significance should be given to it in another enactment
designed for a different purpose.
16
The ostensible result of the court's decision is that a federal court may stay an
action for overtime wages where there is an arbitration clause, provided the plaintiff-
employee is not engaged directly in interstate commerce or provided (as seems to
have been the fact in the instant .case) he is engaged merely -in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce. This result appears to be anomalous, not merely because
the title of the United States Arbitration Act, read in connection with § 2, indi-
cates that the statute was enacted to apply to interstate transactions,
17 but also
because .the decision contains the implication that Congress intended to give the
federal courts power to stay any action involving an issue covered by an arbitration
erning procedure in the federal courts, and was independent of § 2 which was intended
solely to give substantive validity to arbitration agreements involving maritime and inter-
state transactions. This view finds some support in a dictum of Learned Hand, J., in
Shanferoke Coal and Supply Corporation v. Westchester Service Corporation, 70 Fed. (2d)
297, 298 (C. C. A. 2, 1934), aff'd 293 U. S. 449, 55 Sup. Ct. 313 (1935). The contrary
has been held in Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep. Mfg. Co., 44 Fed. (2d) 184 (D. .C. Del. 1930);
In re Cold Metal Process Co., 9 Fed. Supp. 992 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1935); Karno-Smith Co.
v. School District of City of Scranton, 44 Fed. Supp. 860 (D. C. M. D. Pa. 1942).
14. While it is true that in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 272, 38 Sup. Ct. 529
(1918), the Supreme Court stated that mining of coal is not interstate commeree, this view
has been repudiated and a. broader meaning ascribed to "commerce," U. S. v. Darby, 312
U. S. 100, 116, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1941).
15. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491, 63 Sup. Ct. 857 (1943); Stoike v. First Na-
tional Bank, 290 N. Y. 195, 50 N. E. (2d) 246 (1943); cert. denied - U. S. -, 64 Sup.
Ct. 50 (1943).
16. Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 62 Sup. Ct. 1116 (1942).
17. The title of the Act reads as follows: "An Act to make valid and enforceable
written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, mari-
time transactions, or commerce among the States or Territories or with foreign nations."
Section 2 refers to "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce."
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agreement even where the issue may be of a purely intra-state character, but to deny
that power where the arbitration agreement is contained in a contract involving inter-
state employment.
Due to the lack of clarity and cohesion apparent in the above discussed sections of
the United States Arbitration Act, the anomalies considered are understandable. How-
ever, there remains a more substantial ground upon which the decision of the court
may be seriously questioned. As already pointed out, § 3 of the Arbittation Act per-
mits a stay of an action if the issue is one "referable to arbitration." The court
found nothing in the express wording of the Fair Labor Standards Act which pre-
cluded arbitration of claims arising undek that statute. And yet, the whole spirit
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as it has been interpreted by the courts, would
seem to prevent a claim for overtime compensation under that statute being a
subject "referable to arbitration." In Fleming v. Warshawsky1 8 the court pointed
out that legislation, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, in order to effectuate
its evident purpose, must be construed as forbidding any release or other waiver of
the rights and benefits conferred by it upon the intended beneficiary.19 A very
recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals reiterates the principle that, even
where an enactment contains no express prohibition against the waiver of its bene-
fits, such a prohibition will be implied where the statute is designed to protect a
party to a contract from the stronger bargaining power of the other party.20
Numerous decisions, relying principally upon the holding of Fleming v. Warshaw-
sky, 2 ' have held that the employee cannot waive or bargain away the benefits of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, no matter what device is used for 'this purpose. It has
been held that the employee cannot waive or release the benefits given to him by
the Act,2 2 even by way of accord and satisfaction. 23 Good faith on the part of the
18. 123 F. (2d) 622, 626 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
19. The court in Fleming v. Warshawsky relied principally upon U. S. v. Morley Con-
struction Co., 98 F. (2d) 781, 788-789 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). Also see the language in Over-
night Mot6r Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 577, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216 (1942).
20. Wood Co. v. Horgan, -291 N. Y. 422, 52 N. E. (2d) 932 (1943). For other in-
stances where the law preveiits a person from validly waiving the benefits of a statute
designed for his protection see 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 1770.
21. 123 F. (2d) 622 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
22. Fleming v. Carleton Screw Products Co., 37 Fed. Supp. 754 (Minn. 1941); Hutchin-
son v. William C. Barry, Inc., 44 Fed. Supp. 829 (Mass. 1942); Greenberg v. Arsenal
Building Corp., 50 Fed. Supp. 700 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Rubin v. Meadow Provision Co.,
Inc., - Misc. -, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (City Ct. 1942).
23. Probably all courts will agree that there is no basis for an accord and satisfac-
tion as to overtime wages admittedly due. Moreover, it would seem to be generally held
that the liquidated damages provision of the Act is mandatory upon the courts, Calif. v.
Gonzalez, 127 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942) ; Missel v. Overnight Motor Transportation
Co., 126 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942), aff'd, 316 U. S. 572, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216 (1942).
Clour v. Jones, 42 Fed. Supp. 700 (E. D. Okla. 1941), (1941) 55 HARv. L. Rlv. 150, hold-
ing contra, is seemingly overruled in Seneca Coal & Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F. (2d) 359
(C. C. A. 10th, 1943). However, there exists a conflict upon the question whether the
liquidated damages may be waived' as part of an honest accord and satisfaction. Such an
accord and satisfaction was held to be no defense in Fleming v. Warshawsky, 123 F. (2d)
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employer has been held to be unavailing,24 even where there is alleged to be conduct
upon the part of the employee constituting an alleged estoppel.25 More pertinent to
the problem presented by the principal case are the holdings that the employee
cannot contract away the benefits of the Act,26 and it has been held, directly contra
to the decision in the principal case, that an agreement calling for arbitration of
claims arising under the Act are unenforceable.2 7 Not counting technical reasons for
refusing arbitration of employee claims for" overtime compensation,2 8 there are
potent arguments which may be advanced against the enforcement of an arbitration
clause such as that contained in the collective bargaining agreement in the principal
case.
As a general rule the arbitrator's award is as binding as a final judgment and
becomes the sole basis for any further determinations of the rights of the parties
with respect to the demands embraced in the submission,29 and under arbitration
622 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941). Contra, Guess v. Montague, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 4th, 1943),
(1943) 57 HARv. L. Rav. 257; Gangi v. Schulte, - Fed. Supp. - (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Sim-
mons v. Rudolph Knitting Mills, Inc., 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 422 (Sup. Ct. 1942). The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has left the question open where there is a bona fide dispute
betieen the parties, Rigopoulos v. Kervan, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). Also see
O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 267 App. Div. 317, - N. Y. S. (2d) - (1st Dep't 1943);
in which the court was closely divided upon the question.
24. Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216
(1942); Seneca Coal & Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F. (2d) 359, 363 (C. C. A. 10th, 1943).
25. Garrity v. Bagold Corp., 180 Misc. 120, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 257 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Adams v. Union Dime Savings Bank, 48 Fed. Supp. 1022 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); International
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. National Terminals Corp., 50 Fed. Supp. 26 (E. D. Wis. 1943);
Greenberg v. Arsenal Building Corp., 50 Fed. Supp. 700 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). In the fore-
going cases it is doubtful whether the facts pleaded really constituted an estoppel, which in
this type of case would really be difficult to prove. However, true estoppel should be a
defense when proved [see Mortenson v. Western Light & Telephone Co., 42 Fed. Supp.
319, 322 (S. D. Iowa, 1941); Gale v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., - Kan. -, - P. (2d)
- (1944); and, when properly pleaded, should not be dismissed, Munkens v. 1412 Broad-
way, Inc., 50 Fed. Supp. 632 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
26. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 135 P. (2d) 320
(C." C. A. 5th, 1943) ; Johnson v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 130 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A.
8th, 1942); Walling v. Green Head Bit & Supply Co., 138 F. (2a1) 453 (C. C. A. 10th,
1943); Wilkinson v. Noland Co., Inc., 40 Fed. Supp. 1009, 1013 (E. D. Va. 1941). It has
also been held that a contract which fails to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act
may not be reformed to meet with the requirements of the Act, Bailey v. Karolyna Co.,
Ltd., 50 Fed. Supp. 142 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
27. Adams v. Union Dime Savings Bank, 48 Fed. Supp. 1022 (S. D. N. Y. 1943);
Bailey v. Karolyna Co., Ltd., 50 Fed. Supp. 142 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) and cases cited supra
note 5.
28. See Voutrey v. General Baking Co., 39 Fed. Supp. 974 (E. D. Pa. 1941); City
Service Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. Vanzo, 179 Misc. 368, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 24 (Sup.
Ct. 1942).
29. KELLER, ARBiTRATIoN ix AcTIoN (1941) 4; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938)
§ 1927; RFSTATEENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 445; New York Lumber & Wood Working
Company v. Schneider, 119 N. Y. 475,,24 N. E. 4 (1890).
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statutes, an award may be summarily enforced °30 Like most arbitration statutes the
United States Arbitration Act specifically provides for vacation or modification of
an award only on grounds of fraud, misconduct, collusion, obvious bias, evident
mistake of fact in the nature of a clerical error, or similar grounds.31 Unless the
arbitration agreement by some very strong language prohibits the arbitrators from
disregarding principles of law,32 the arbitrators become a law unto themselves and may
do justice with an utter disregard of legal technicalities or the law itself.n If the
general rules of arbitration are applicable to claims for overtime compensation under
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, a most paradoxical situation is
created. On the one hand we have arbitration awards upheld as valid, even though
the arbitrators have completely disregarded the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (including those as to coverage) in making the award. On the other hand we
would have the same courts which must uphold such awards, expressing with equal
fervor the principle that they are bound by the mandatory nature of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and must disregard the apparent justice or injustice of the claim-
ant's cause of action. If the subject matter of the submission to arbitration were
limited to questions of fact, such as the number of hours worked, the inconsistency
might not be so glaring. It does not appeat that the submission in the principal
case was so circumscribed and, therefore, since it has been unanimously held that
no contract is valid which removes overtime services "from the reach of dominant
constitutional powers,"13 4 it is difficult to discern how a contract, by the expedient
of an arbitration clause, may frustrate the purposes of the Act.
Arbitration of employee claims under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act is generally not permitted under state arbitration legislation." If the instant
decision is upheld, it will mean that enforcement of arbitration clauses relating to
such claims will depend upon the court (federal or state) in which the question
arises. The application of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act should
not be allowed to hang upon the employee's choice of the jurisdiction in which he
commences suit.3 6 The intended uniformity of application discernible in the Act will
be defeated by the conflicting views which have been brought'into focus by the
present decision and the situation should be remedied by either the Supreme Court
or by Congress.
30. A -urvey of statutory methods of enforcement may be found in STUIRGES, CoM-
mERciAL ARBrrioN AND AWARDs (1930) §§ 308-359.
31. 43 STAT. 885, 9 U. S. C. A. §§ 10, 11 (1925).
32. White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 220 Ill. 578, 77 N. E. 327 (1906).
33. Johnson v. Noble, 13 N. H. 286 (1842); Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U. S. 345 (1854);
James Richardson & Sons, Ltd. v. W. E. Hedger Transportation Corp., 98 F. (2d) 55
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N. Y.,392 (1875).
34. Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v.. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 577, 62 Sup. Ct.
1212 (1942).
35. See notes 5 and 8 supra.
36. There exists a conflict among the federal district courts upon the question whether
an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, commenced in a state court, is removable
to a federal court. The conflicting decisions are set forth in Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 Fed.
Supp. 794 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
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GIFTS MORTIS CAUsA-DELIvERY-AGENCY.-On the day when he went to the
hospital the deceased handed the superintendent of the building, in which he was
employed as a fireman, a savings bank book. This savings bank book was enclosed in
a sealed envelope upon which the name of the deceased was written. When he handed
the envelope to the superintendent he said: "If anything happens to me I want Bob
(the deceased's nephew) to have this." Before the contemplated death occurred
the supdrintendent showed the envelope to the aforementioned nephew and then put it
back into the desk where he had kept it since it was given to him by the deceased,
but after the death occurred he took it from the desk and gave it to the nephew.
Held, that this was not a valid gift mortis-causa on the ground that there was no de-
livery during the donor's lifetime. In re Cardwell's Estate, 180 Misc. 854, 43 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 773 (Surr. Ct. 1943)."
The subject matter of the alleged gift, a savings bank book,' admits of a valid gift
of the account by means of the symbolical delivery of the bank book accompanied by
evidence of a present donative intent. If the intent and the delivery are united, the
gift is complete.2
The fundamental question.in the principal case is: Was there a delivery? The
Surrogate relies strongly on a dictum in Vincent v. Rix.3 In this case the donor handed
securities to her attorney and instructed him to give said securities to donee. The
attorney put them in his own safe and later removed them to the donor's safe deposit
box Where they were found at the time of her death. They were not delivered, or
even tendered to donee. The attorney informed donee's mother of the gift, previous
to the donor's death, and the mother instructed him to hold them for safe-keeping.
The court said: "This did not constitute a delivery to the mother. Mere words never
constitute a delivery." Sed quacre: Why may not a donee, upon tender of a gift
by an agent of the donor, ask the agent to hold it for the donee? Is the magic of
a physical delivery back to the agent necessary to create a valid gift? Something
of this situation seems to be" present in Vincent v. Rix when the mother instructed the
attorney to hold the securities for her daughter but the argument was dismissed on
the ground that "mere words never constitute a delivery."
In the Cardwell case the possibility of satisfying the gift by the suggested method
of constructive delivery seems to be too remote to be complete. In the first place,
the superintendent and the donor occupy the relationship of employer-employee, im-
pelling the assumption that the superintendent is agent of the donor. The envelope
is sealed and bears the name of the deceased; the superintendent is authorized to
deliver only if and when death occurs. Thus the whole transaction smacks of a testa-
1. The distinction between a savings bank book and a pass bank book evidencing a
commercial checking account is well settled. The savings bank book is a true symbol which
"unlocks" the deposit, whereas a pass book on a commercial account is not effective to
"unlock" the account even when presented to the bank by the depositor. Brophy v.
Haeberle, 220 App. Div. 511, 221 N. Y. Supp. 698 (4th Dep't 1927); Jones v. Weakley,
99 Ala. 441, 12 So. 420 (1893); Herrings v. Elliott, 218 Ala. 203, 118 So. 391 (1928);
Providence Inst. for Savings v. Taft, 14 R. I. 502 (1884).
2. Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 26 N. E. 627 (1891); see 28 C. J. 702.
3. 248 N. Y. 76, 82, 161 N. E. 425, 427 (1928). The court concluded that the deceased
was without power to give away without consideration the property left to her for life,
but it assumed, for the purpose of its opinion, that the deceased could make a gift.
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mentary disposition and warrants the refusal of the Court to adjudge the gift com-
pleted without delivery to the donee and without the precautions which surround the
making of a will. Again it should be noted that gifts made in contemplation of death
are not favored by the courts. ,Nevertheless, when the proof establishes a valid gift
of that nature it should be upheld. 4 Because many gifts are sought to be shown by
oral evidence after the donor's death it is necessary for the public good to require
clear and satisfactory evidence of the facts to prevent fraud aid perjury.5 Although
the proof must be clear and convincing, no greater proof is necessary than that which
must be offered to prove any claim.6 No case is found where gifts have been sus-
tained when the husband is a claimant and the only proof of his claim is the testi-
mony given by his own wife.
7
As a collateral point Surrogate Delehanty states in the instant case: "It is clear that
the statutory restrictions on the making of oral wills would be completely emasculated
if the requirements for delivery to the donee in the case of gifts causa mortis were
not enforced. Our statute has limited the privilege of oral will making to soldiers.and
sailors in actual military or naval service or to a mariner at sea.8"
What about the possible relaxation of the rules regarding gifts mortis causa in favor
of soldiers and sailors in time of war? According to the weight of American authority
the risk of a dangerous journey 9 does not furnish an adequate "peril of death" suffi-
cient to support a gift mortis causa. Neither has one who is about to participate in
war a justifiable apprehension of death,10 though apparently in England an opposite
view would be adopted." The American attitude is in some measure inconsistent
4. Bedell v. CarlI, 33 N. Y. 581, 585 (1865).
5. Matter of Van Alstyne,-207 N. Y. 298, 308, 100 N. E. 802, 805 (1913).
6. Ward v. New York Life Insurance Co., 225 N. Y. 314, 122 N. E. 207 (1919).
7. Matter of Buoninfante, 125 Misc. 907, 212 N. Y. Supp. 265 (1925).
8. Section 16 of the N. Y. Decedent Estate Law sets forth this rule as follows: "No
nuncupative or unwritten . . . will . . . shall be valid unless made by a soldier or sailor
while in actual military or naval service, or by a mariner while at sea." (Italics added). This
section was derived from 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. § 22, providing: "Unwritten or nuncupative
wills are valid only when made by soldiers engaged in military service or mariners at sea."
Section 141 of the N. Y. Surrogate's Court Act provides: "Before an oral nuncupative
will is admitted to probate its execution and the tenor thereof must be proved by at least
two witnesses." Section 16 of the N. Y. Decedent Estate Law requires that a nuncupative
oral will be made within the hearing of two persons and the execution and the tenor
thereof be proved by at least two witnesses. See Comment (1943) 12 FoRDtrEA L. REv. 153.
9. Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barb. 370 (N. Y. 1867).
10. In Reedy v. Kelly, 206 Ala. 132, 89 So. 275 (1921), the court justifies its holding by
saying: "The natural apprehension of an alleged donor that he will lose his life in a mili-
tary service into which, he is entering . . . is not the character or quality of apprehendedly
imminent, -impending danger or death that will answer the stated essential condition to a
gift causa mortis." Contra: Gass v. Simpson, 4 Cold. 288 (Tenn. 1867); see PoMMRoy, EQMVY
JURISPRUDEWCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1146: "Such a donation may be made by a donor who
anticipates his speedy death . . . because he . . . expects soon to be exposed to some great
and unusual peril of his life; as by a soldier soon before entering into battle."
11. See BRAcroN, Dr Lxaraus ANGL , lib. 2, fol. 60, who specifically includes soldiers
and sailors about to depart for wat or sea travel.
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with the established line of cases, which hold that one who anticipates submission to
a surgical operation may make a valid gift mortis causa.12 "There is no reason to hold
that a man can make a valid donation when he is about to undergo a surgical oper-
ation but cannot do so when he is about to peril his life at the call of duty or in the
cause of humanity."' 3
It must be admitted that pending surgical operations, as possible causes of death,
are closely related to serious illness as a sufficient basis for making a gift mortis causa.
Is it not permissible to argue that in view of the increasing destruction of human life,
both civilian and military, during the present World War, the foregoing rules pro-
hibiting gifts mortis causa by soldiers and sailors may be subject to relaxation in
the future? To date such discussions have not been forthcoming out of the present
World War but such extensions of the rule would seem to rest upon a plausible and
defensible base.
LARCENY-HUSBAND AND WIFE-CRIMINAL GUILT FOR APPROPRIATING PROPERTY
oF SPOUSE.-The accused, a married woman, was arrested on a warrant charging
her with grand larceny in violation of the Penal Law of the State of New York, by
knowingly and unlawfully appropriating to her own use property of her husband con-
sisting of cash and a diamond ring. Upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus,
the accused produced evidence of a marriage of long standing with her husband and
claimed that she was his lawful wife and living with him at the time of the alleged
larceny. Held, that the writ should be sustained on the ground that the common
law rule that a wife cannot commit larceny by appropriating her husband's prop-
erty has not been changed by statute in New York. Peoplt ex rel. Felmere v. Rapp,
180 Misc. 839, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 410 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
It is well settled, of course, that husband and wife may be guilty of crimes com-
mitted against the person of each other,' but the rule with respect to crimes com-
mitted against the property of each other is somewhat less clear. At common law,
the general rule was that a spouse would not be guilty of crimes against the other
spouse's property,2 but whether this rule is to prevail since the adoption of the
12. Ridden v. Thrall, 125"N. Y. 572, 26 N. E. 627, 11 L. R. A. 684 (1891).
13. Agnew v. Belfast Banking Co., 2 Ir. R. 204, 219 (1896), per Fitzgibbon, L. J.
1. At common law husband and wife were criminally liable for such offenses as murder,
manslaughter, mayhem and aggravated assault directed at the other spouse; 3 VERNUER, AmER-
cAN FAImLY LAWS (1st ed. 1935) 162. The marital relation, however, was a defense to some
acts which would have been felonies if committed against an unmarried woman, such as rape,
Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. Rep. 142, 86 S. W. 754 (1905) ; State Y. Haines, 51 La. Ann.
731, 25 So. 372 (1899)s and assault, 1 BI. Comm. 444; cf. Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89
AtI. 889 (1914). But a.husband at common law and under statute today may be guilty
of rape for aiding and abetting the rape of his wife, State v. Doweil, 106 N. C. 722, 11
S. E. 525 (1890); see N. Y. PEmxA LAW § 2.
2. At common law neither spouse was guilty of arson for burning the property of
the other: Rex v. March, 1 Moody C. C. 182, 168 Eng. Rep. R. 1233 (1828); Snyder v.
People, 26 Mich. 106 (1872) ; Kopcyznski v. State, 137 Wisc. 358, 118 N. W. 863 (1908) ;
nor for larceny of the other's goods, Rex v. Willis, 1 Moody C. C. 375, 168 Eng. Rep. R.
1309 (1833); Reg. v. Kenny 11877] 2 Q. B. D. 307.
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Married Women's Acts,3 in the absence of express legislation to the contrary, has
been the subject of considerable conflict in decisions rendered in New York and other
jurisdictions.
Under the Penal Law of New York, common law crimes have been abolished and
only those crimes are recognized which are prescribed or defined by the Penal Law
or by a statute not repealed by it.4 Section 1290 of the Penal Law, defining the
statutory crime of larceny in New York, provides, in general, that "a person" who
with criminal intent, unlawfully takes or appropriates personal property from the
possession of another, steals such property and is guilty of larceny.5 The statute
contains no provision for exempting any person from liability. This gives rise to the
question whether the statute is to apply to persons who were formerly immune to
prosecution at common law. 'Before discussing the conflicting views on this question
as expressed in the various decisions, it may be helpful to review briefly the reasons
for the common law rule and the general purpose and effect of the Married Wompn's
Acts.
At common law marriage deprived the wife of the right to a separate legal estate
in her own property and the husband acquired thereby the right to use and enjoy
whatever property his wife owned at the time of the marriage or acquired during
coverture.6 The husband was vested absolutely with the wife's money, goods and
chattels,7 and her choses in action were his upon reducing them to his possession.8
The fee to her real estate remained in the wife but the husband had the right to
its possession and usufruct for the duration of the covertbre.9 The wife, on the other
hand, had no legal right or interest in the personal property of her husband,10 al-
though she could exercise control over it as his agent." Since larceny, at common
law, was a crime against the possession of property, requiring a taking without the
consent of the rightful possessor,'- the husband could not commit this crime against
the property of his wife because, as we have seen, he owned such property abso-
lutely.' 3 But the immunity to prosecution was also extended to the wife for larceny
of her husband's property despite the absence of a legal right to possess his prop-
erty.' 4 This immunity was based on the common-law fiction that by marriage bus-
3. See N. Y. DomsTic RELATIoNs LAW §§ 50-61 incl.
4. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 22; People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373, 99 N. E. 841 (1912).
5. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1290. The statutory crime of larceny in New York embraces
the former crimes of common law larceny by asportation, common law larceny by trick
and device, obtaining property by false pretenses, and embezzlement. Distinctions which
formerly differentiated these crimes have been eliminated and abolished. L. 1942, c. 732, § 1;
(1942) 11 FOaDHAm L. REV. 323.
6. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMEsTIc RIETIrONs, (1931) §§ 28, 31-33.
7. 2 KENT, COMM. (12th ed. 1896) 144.
8. Id. at 135.
9. Bank of America v. Banks, 101 U. S. 240, 243 (1879).
10. Holmes v. Holmes, 3 Paige 363 (N. Y. 1832).
11. People v. Schuyler, 6 Cowen 572 (N. Y. 1827).
12. Mnmtz, CRiiNAL LAW (1934) § 109; Fitch v. State, 135 Fla. 361, 185 So. 435
(1938).
13. Thomas v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 162, 165 (1869).
14. Rex v. Willis, 1 Moody C. C. 375, 168 Eng. Rep. Repr. 1309 (1833). But in Reg. v.
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band and wife were in law one and the same person, 15 with the'wife's legal existence
being suspended during coverture, or at least merged into that of the husband.1 6
The result was that the wife was incapable of possessing property apart from her
husband and hence could not be guilty of a felonious taking of his property.17
The Married Women's Acts, which have had as their fundamental objectives the
removal of the wife's common law disabilities and the equalization of the rights of
husband and wife,18 have swept away practically all of the legal incidents of mar-
riage which gave rise to the common law doctrine of the legal unity of the spouses. 19
But the doctrine has remained to plague the courts in the construction of the Acts
as affecting legal actions between husband and wife and crimes against the property
of each other. Thus, since the primary purpose of the enabling Acts was to free
the wife froin the husband's control of her property, the courts have generally held
that the Acts enable her to maintain an action against him for torts to her property
interests; 20 but they have found that she may not maintain an action against him
for torts to her person,21 even though the statutes contain a provision enabling
Featherstone, Irears C. C. 369, 169 Eng. Rep. Repr. 764 (1854), Lord Campbell stated:
. . . this .rule is properly and reasonably qualified when she (the wife) becomes an
adulteress. She thereby determines her quality of wife, and her property in her husband's
goods ceases." Cf. Reg. v. Kenny, [1877] 2 Q. B. D. 307, 311.
15. In Phillips v. Barnet, [1876] 1 Q. B. D. 436, 439, Blackburn, J. stated: "The reason,
therefore, why the wife cannot sue the husband for beating her must be because they are
one and the same person, and the same reason exists in criminal law, where a woman cannot
be convicted of larceny. . . " See also Reg. v. Kenny, [1877] 2 Q. B. D. 307.
16. 1 BL. Comm. 433. It should be noted that the doctrine of legal unity of husband
and wife was crdated by the common law courts by which, during the formative period of
the doctrine, marriage was qonsidered in no other light than as a civil contract. Ibid. But
the doctrine was disregarded by the common law in criminal matters, was not applied sub-
stantively in many civil matters and was never recognized in equity or the ecclesiastical
Courts. McCuany, ToRTs BETWEEN PERSONS 3x DomEsTic REAT ONs (1930) 43 HAv.
L. Rzv. 1035.
17. Rex'v. Willis, I Moody C. C. 375, 168 Eng. Rep. Repr. 1309 (1833). One, authority
has offered the further explanation that the husband, by endowing the wife at marriage
with all his worldly goods, gave her a "kind of interest" in them. 1 HAwxINS, PLEAS o
THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824) 147. But this explanation seems out of harmony with the
strict legal concept of marriage prevailing at common law. See note 16 supra.
18. 3 VERNmz, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3.
19. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 615, 31 Sup. Ct. 111 (1910) ;People ex rtl.
Carr v. Martin, 286 N. Y. 27, 35 N. E. (2d) 636 (1941). In the latter case it was stated
that the Married Women's Acts and other statutes "have so changed the status of husband
and wife that few vestiges are left of the icommon-law concept of the unity of husband
and wife.... Y
20. PROSSER, TORTS (5th ed. 1941) 900-901. A wife may bring an action against her
husband for conversion, Whitney v. Whitney, 49 Barb. 319 (N. Y. 1867); for replevin,
Howland v. Howland, 20 Hun. 472 (N. Y. 1880); and for ejectment, Wood v. Wood,
83 N. Y. 575 (1881).
21. See Comment, Personal Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife (1935) 4 FORD-
Am L. Rzv. 475; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111 (1910); Schultz
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married women "to sue separately for torts committed against them as fully and
freely as if they were unmarried.122 The decisive factor in such decisions has been
the doctrine of legal unity.
The question of the principal case-whether one spouse can commit larceny of
the property of the other spouse-has been adjudicated in only three previous New
York cases, all lower court decisions. In the first case,23 decided in 1911, a husband
was convicted of grand larceny for stealing his wife's jewels. The conviction was
reversed in the Appellate Division on the ground that the evidence failed to con-
nect the defendant with the crime. The case can hardly be considered as authority,
except possibly by mere inference, for the proposition that a husband can commit
larceny of his wife's property. In the second case, People ex rel. Troare v. Mc-
Clelland,24 decided in 1933, it was declared that the New York courts are bound by
the common law rule unless it has been abrogated by statute. The Married Women's
Acts were held not to have changed the common law doctrine on the following
grounds: (1) Decisions denying one spouse a right of action against the other for
personal torts, even though the wife has been enabled to bring such actions against
third persons, have 'shown that the common law doctrine of legal unity of husband
and wife has not been abrogated;25 (2) the penal statutes of New York must be
strictly construed and if the Legislature intended that a husband or wife is "a person"
within the meaning of the larceny statute it should have so stated; 26 and (3) even
if a spouse came within the penal statute, such a fact would not of itself destroy the
common law rule that a spouse cannot commit larceny of the other's property, as
that doctrine is based not alone upon the legal unity of the spouses, but upon the
unity of the social relationship of marriage, "giving the word social its broadest
meaning."'2 7
'i. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882) ; Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N. Y. 1865); Perlman
'v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 117 Misc. 353, 191 N. Y. Supp. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Allen v.
Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927); Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E.
23 (1935). See also McCURDY, TORTS BETWEE, PERsONs IN DomEsTIc RELATIONs (1930)
43 HARV. L. REV. 1033. Cf. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 660 (1938).
22. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111 (1910).
23. People v. Decker, 143 App. Div. 590, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (2d Dep't 1911).
24. 146 Misc. 545, 263 N. Y. Supp. 403 (Sup. Ct. 1933). Wife was charged with grand
larceny for taking money from her husband's possession at night without his consent. See
N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 1294 (2).
25. Cf. N. Y. DOMEsTic REILATioNs LAW § 57, enabling a husband and wife to bring an
action against each other for injuries to person, property or character. Coster v. Coster,
289 N. Y. 438, 46 N. E. (2d) 509 (1943), (1943) 12 FoRDHAm L. REv. 133.
26. Cf. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 21, providing that the Penal Law must not be strictly con-
strued. People v. Abeel, 182 N. Y. 415, 75 N. E. 307 (1905), People v. Reilly, 280 N. Y.
509, 19 N. E. (2d) 919 (1939).
27. People ex rel. Troare v. McClelland, 146 Misc. 545, 263 N. Y. Supp. 403, 406 (Sup.
Ct. 1933). This last reason follows the theory advanced in relatively recent cases for
bolstering the policy of adherence to the common law rule. See State v. Arnold, 182 Minn.
313, 315, 235 N. W. 373, 374 (1931), Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106, 109 (1872), Stat.
v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 323, 97 N. E. 976, 977 (1912).
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The last case, People ex rel. Rossiter v. Rossiter,8 2 decided in 1940, reached a
result contrary to the Troare case on the ground that whether or not the Married
Women's Acts abrogated the common law doctrine of the unity of the spouses,
"the protection of society and the social interest served by refusing to permit a
criminal or offender wholly to avoid the prescribed penfal sanction are greater than
the interest served by the preservation and enforcement in this instance of the doc-
trine of merger by unity of marriage." 29 There is ample authority for this view.30
While the question has not been decided by the New York Court of Appeals, a
dictum by Lehman, Chief Justice, in a recent cases ' seems to indicate clearly that
that court is not married to the common law doctrine of legal unity of the spouses.
It was stated that the question whether the common law rule that neither husband
nor wife can commit a crime through appropriation or destruction of the property
of the other survives the statutory changes in the status and mutual rights and obli-
gations of husband and wife is not free from doubt.
It is rather apparent from the cases that by a strict construction of the Married
Women's Acts and the introduction of arguments relative to the social aspects of
the mdrriage relationship, courts have reached the conclusion that a husband or
wife cannot steal from the other. On the other hand, by a liberal construction of
the statutes and the introduction of considerations of public policy, the courts
have arrived at a contrary conclusion. A choice between these conflicting views
must be made in jurisdictions, such as New York, where the law has not as yet been
authoritatively determined.
Of those who argue that the peace and sanctity of the family might be destroyed
if the common law rule is abrogated, it may be asked: What is the nature-of the
marriage sanctity that must be protected by permitting one spouse to steal or fraudu-
lently misappropriate the property of the other without being subject to the penal
sanction? It would seem that the wrongdoing spouse by his or her theft has deter-
mined the quality of the marriage relationship and that there is little sanctity left
to protect. While it is true that courts are hesitant to interfere in family contro-
versies, such a policy does not necessarily apply where the offense is against the
state. There seems little dispute that the legal status ,of husbands and wives has been
changed universally in this country from the former common law status and that
in New York particularly, the substantive and procedural reasons for the common
law doctrine of legal unity of the spouses have been removed. Since it is recognized
today that husband and wife have separate legal entities, the flexibility of the com-
mon law32 and the failure of the legislature to incorporate the common law concept
28. 173 Misc. 268, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 30 (N. Y. City Ct. 1940). Husband was charged
with larceny by appropriating certain of his wife's money for his own purposes.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Hunt v. State, 72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769 (1904), Beasley v. State, 138 Ind. 552, 38
N. E.'35 (1894), People v. Graff, 59 Cal. App. 706, 211 P. 829 (1922), State v. Koontz,
124 Kans. 216, 257 P. 944 (1927).
31. People ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 286 N. Y. 27, 30, 35 N. E. (2d) 636 (1941).
32. See Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 157, 140 N. E. 227 (1923), holding that a wife
may maintain an action for criminal conversation against a woman for having criminal
intercourse with her husband without her privity, connivance or consent.
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of legal unity of the spouses in the statutes83 should enable the New York courts to
discard the unity doctrine, as they have other outmoded common law concepts, and
consider the crimes of either spouse as they would those of a third person.
MILITARY LAw-THE JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL OVER CIVILIANS.-
The relator was employed under a written contract executed in the United States
by Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. and working hs a mechanic at an airfield, super-
vised and controlled by the United States Army in Eritrea, Africa, a former
enemy territory, now occupied by the American forces. The contract between
the Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. and the Army provided, among other matters,
that the compensation to be paid to the former was on a cost-plus-fee basis
and that the Army could supervise the work of the Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.
personnel. The relator was housed in barracks erected and maintained by the
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., treated by its physicians, and received his passes to
leave camp from his employer. While on a leave on such a pass, the relator was
accused of the theft of a diamond ring valued at $300.00 by an officer of the United
States Army. He was tried and convicted on this charge by a General Court Martial
and, at the time of this suit, was imprisoned at the military prison at Governors
Island, New York. The relator's sister sued on a writ of habeas corpus to test the
validity of the jurisdiction of the military court. The District Court dismissed
the writ. In re Di Bartolo, 50 Fed. Supp. 929 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
The court based its decision on its interpretation of Section (d) of the Second
Article of the Articles of War which states that "all retainers to the camp, and all
persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war all such retainers
br persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States in the
field, both within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States"'
are subject to court martial as provided in the Articles of War. The decision falls
within a field of law which is in a state of flux.
The status of military tribunals in general is derived from the Constitution of
the United States. 2 Although the Constitution limits the power of such tribunals
to those cases "arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia in time of war,"3
it does not specifically confine the jurisdiction to persons in the military or naval
services. 4 In his dissenting opinion to Ex parte Milligan,5 the first decision of the
33. See People v. Brengard, 265 N. Y. 100, 191 N. E. 850 (1934), holding that the
common law rule that an indictment for murder would not lie where death did not occur until
more than a year and a day after the assault had been abrogated by the legislature since
it did not incorporate that common law rule in the penal statutes.
1. 41 STAT. 787, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1473 (d) (1920).
2. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, 16.
3. U. S. CONST. AmEND. V. This clause has been judicially interpreted as having the
same meaning as Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct. 148 (1885).
4. Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals in the United States Over Civilians
(1924) 12 CALIF. L. REv. 75, 76.
5. 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
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United States Supreme Court to pass upon the extent of the jurisdiction of military
tribunals under the Constitution, Chief Justice Chase formulated a classical defini-
tion which distinguishes military law, military government, and martial law, as
separate types of military jurisdiction. 6 The court is concerned with the first of
these jurisdictions, which is exercised through the medium of the court martial. The
case of Dynes v. Hoover7 not only determined the constitutional status of the
court martial, but also laid down the rule that the decision of a court martial over
the subject matter of the inquiry cannot be questioned by the civil courts. However,
since a court martial is a tribunal of special and limited jurisdiction,8 its judgments
are open to collateral attack so far as questions relating to jurisdiction are con-
cerned. s Jurisdiction is tested by means of a writ of habeas corpus,' 0 and the
burden is upon the party asserting the validity of the judgment of the court martial
to prove the existence of the necessary jurisdictional facts."
The adjudicated cases under Section (d) of the Second Article of the Articles of
War' 2 have generally confined the application of this section to either members of
the armed forces or persons employed directly by the armed forces or its members.
Under this section clerks employed by paymasters of the army,'3 or of the navy,14
a cook on a military supply ship,15 and a teamster,16 a stenographer,' 7 and a superin-
tendent' 8 permanently employed by the Quartermasters Corps at an army post,
have all been held subject to the jurisdiction of a court martial. There have been
6. Id. at 141, 142. The dissent states: "There are under the" Constitution three kinds
of military jurisdictions; one exercised in both peace and war; another to be exercised
in time of foreign war without the boundary of the United States, or in time of rebellion
and civil war within states or districts occupied by the rebels treated as belligerents; and
the third to be exercised in time of invasion or in insurrection within the territorial limits
of the United States maintaining adhesion to the National Government when the public
danger requires its exercise." The court explained further that these three types of military
jurisdictions are called military law, military government, and martial law respectively.
7. 20 How. 65 (U. S. 1857).
8. Ver Mehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
9. Carter v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496, 20 Sup. Ct. 713 (1899); McClaughry v. Deming,
186 U. S. 49, 22 Sup. Ct. 786 (1901); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. "11, 41 Sup. Ct. 227
(1921).
10. U. S. ex rel. Daniels v. Wessels, 276 Fed. 844 (C. C. A. N. Y. 1922); Romero v.
Squier, 133 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. Wash. 1943).
11. Ver Mehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
12. 41 STAT. 787, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1473 (1920).
13. In re Bendex, Fed. Cas. No. 14616 (1873).
14. Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 (1879) ; Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109, 15 Sup. Ct.
773 (1894). Contra: Ex parte Van Vranken, 47 Fed. 888 (C. C. E. D. V. A. 1891). The
last mentioned case is distinguishable from the first two where the defendants were on
sea duty, whereas in the last cited case the jurisdiction of the court martial was denied
where the defendant was stationed on land.
15. Es parte Falls, 251 Fed. 145 (N. J. 1919).
16. Pundt v. Pendleton, 167 Fed. 997 (Ga. 1909).
17. Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (C, C. A. S. C. 1919).
18. Ex parte Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (Tex. 1919).
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a* few cases involving civilians or employees of independent contractors. The earliest
reported decision 10 involved a civilian arrested by the military authorities under
a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians. The jurisdiction of the court
martial was found lacking because the defendant was a civilian. During World War I,
in a case similar to the principal case, Ex parte Weitz,20 the court held that a truck
driver, employed and paid by a private contractor working at an army camp in
the United States, was not subject to court martial under Section (d) of the Second
Articles of War.21 The decision of the court in the Weitz case seems to restrict the
application of this section to "civilians having a direct relation to transport, main-
tenance or supply of the army in the field."2 2 Judge Rifkind, in all probability, used
this test as a basis for his statement that the Weitz case would support the juris-
diction by the military authorities in the principal case.23 However, it has been held
that a merchant seaman, who struck his superior officer, not a member of the armed
forces, while aboard a United States vessel containing military cargo, in an active
theatre of military operations, was not punishable by court martial.24 It would
seem that a merchant seaman on convoy duty would be among the first of those
civilians listed as "having a direct relation to transport, maintenance and supply
of the army in the field." The Weitz case is distinguishable from the principal case
in the fact that the crime in the former case was committed within the territorial
limits of the United States, but the phrase "in the field" used in Section (d), as
defined and interpreted by the courts, means any encampment within or without
the territorial limits of the United States.25 In another case, a discharged seaman,
receiving transportation home from a foreign port who volunteered to stand watch
and then refused to do so, was held subject to court martial. 26 In this latter case,
the court stressed the fact that the seaman by volunteering to stand watch placed
himself directly under the jurisdiction of the military and therefore subjected him-
self to military discipline.
The Judge Advocate General's office has ruled27 that officials of the American
Red Cross, in France, were subject to disciplinary proceedings by court martial.
This question has never been submitted to the civil courts and, while the opinion
of the Judge Advocate General is not binding upon, the courts, it would, however,
probably be upheld, either on the theory that such officials of the Red Cross are
"accompanying" the armed forces or that the Red Cross is an auxiliary arm of
19. Walters v. Campbell, Fed. Cis. No. 17265, 5 Sawy. 17 (U. S. 1877).
20. 256 Fed. 58 (Mass. 1919).
21. 41 STAT. 787, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1473 (d) (1920).
22. Ex parte Weitz, 256 Fed. 58, 59 (Mass. 1919).
23. In re Di Bartolo, 51 Fed. Supp. 929, 934 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
24. Hamond v. Squier, 51 F. (2d) 227 (E. D. Wash. 1943). A comment on this case
distinguishes it from the principal case in that Congress has enacted a code (36 STAT.
1166, 46 U. S. C. A. § 701) governing the conduct of seamen and has provided special
punishment for offenses against discipline. Comment (1943) 3 LAw. GUMw REv. 32. See
also McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 Fed. Supp. 80 (E. D. Va. 1943).
25. Ex parte Weitz, 256 Fed. 58 (Mass. 1918); Hamond v. Squier, 51 Fed. Supp. 227
(E. D. Wash. 1943).
26. Ex parte Gerlack, 247 Fed. 616 (N. Y. 1917).
27. 1917 Op. J. A. G. 273.
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the armed forces. Support for such a view inay be found in a decision which
recognizes the unique character of the Red Cross by holding that, although it is
not part of the military or naval forces, it is, nevertheless, an auxiliary to such
forces, and therefore an interference with it by defamatory statements and remarks
which might shake public confidence or reduce contributions thereto, can be prose-
cuted under the Espionage Act of 1917.28
In the principal case there was no military government in Eritrea established
by the American forces to deal with civilian offenses.-9 The exhibits annexed to
the return to the writ of habeas corpus30 show that prior to the occupation of the
American Armies a miiltary government was established by the British army in
that country and that by agreement between the generals commanding both armies,
the British Provost Courta continued to function with limited jurisdiction over
both British and American civilians.82 It further appears that the British Provost
Court refused to take jurisdiction over the relator in the instant case, because
the English Statutory Law places this class of civilian under the jurisdiction of
the court martial.83 Even though there was no civil court of competent jurisdiction
in Eritrea, that fact should not arbitrarily confer such jurisdiction upon the court
rmartial.3 4
The courts, in construing doubtful constitutional or statutory provisions, may
ascertain the mischief designed to be remedied or the purpose to be accomplished,
and may examine the proceedings of the constitutional convention or the hearings
before the congressional committee in order to ascertain the true intention. 5 The
rationale behind the statute subjecting civilians to military law was to bring under
the jurisdiction of the military the innumerable persons of divers interests attached
to or following the army.86 When the legislature revised the Second Article of War
28. Granzow v. United States, 261 Fed. 172 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
29. Comment (1943) 3 LAW. Gu= RExv. 32, 33.
30. Answer t6 Habeas Corpus. Exhibits B, C and D on file No. Ci. 21-236, S. D. N. Y.
31. A provost court is a judicial tribunal under military government, the second type
of military jurisdiction, and should not be confused with the court martial which is the
judicial vehicle under military law. See note 6 supra.
32. See Government Brief on Return to Habeas Corpus.
33. Army Act, 1881, 44 and 45 Vict. c. 58 § 175-178.
34. A court which lacks jurisdiction cannot adjudicate. In re Braver, 51 F. (2d) 123
(Mich. 1931); Detroit Trust Co. v. Duntz, 59 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. Mich. 1932).
35. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315 (U. S. 1819). In re Opinion of the Justices,
233 Mass. 603, 125 N. E. 849 (1920); Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks
v. McDonald, 253 N. Y. 234, 170 N. E. 902 (1930).
36. Major General Crowder, Judge Advocate General, testifying before the Senate
hearing on the revision to Article 63, said: "In the present condition of our Articles of
War 'retainers to the camp' (i.e., officers' serkrants, newspaper correspondents, telegraph
operators, etc.), and 'persons serving with the armies in the field' (i.e., civilian clerks, team-
sters, laborers, interpreters, guides, contract surgeons, officials, and employees of the provost
marshal general's department, officers and men employed on transports, etc.) are made
subject to the Articles of War only during the period and pendency of war and while in
the theater of military operations. A number of persons who manage to accompany the
Army, not in the capacity of retainers or of persons serving therewith, are not included.
They constitute a class whose subjection to the Articles of War is quite as necessary as
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in 1916, 3 7 it provided that, in addition to camp retainers and persons serving with
the armed forces, "those persons accompanying" the armed forces are subject to
court inartial.38 The court in the case at bar, interpreted this addition to the
statute as indicating that Congress evinced its intention to include within the
statute, a third and broader class of persons and that the relator was such a person
falling within this classification.3 9 Such an interpretation is a novel one. While
Congress undoubtedly did intend to broaden the scope of the statute, it probably
meant to include only those persons commonly designated as "camp followers" such
as, the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the U.S.O. and similar organizations. It
would likewise include those unmentionables who from time immemorial have
followed the armies for private gain. To carry the court's interpretation to its
logical conclusion, it would seem that the laundress, the baker, the cook, the tailor,
the auditor, the office assistant and any other employee of the Douglas Aircraft Co.,
Inc., in Eritrea, doing a type of work only indirectly connected with the repair of
aircraft, i.e. employed for the comfort and well being of the mechanics, would
likewise be considered subject to court martial.
Military law is the system of rules and regulations 40 established for the govern-
ment of all persons in military service. It deals particularly with the maintenance
of discipline within the armed forces and the regulation of the administration
therein. Since the ordinary rules of law do not seek to cope with the problems
peculiar to the government of an army, it can readily be seen that a special set
of rules is indispensable to the very existence of an army.41 Court-martial procedure
is unlike that of the civil criminal courts, being generally free from the restrictions
and safeguards imposed by law upon civilian courts. 42 - In discussing this question,
in the case of the two classes expressly mentioned. Accordingly the article has been ex-
panded to include also persons accompanying the Army." Sen. Rep. No. 130, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess., 37. Major General Crowder also advised that the statute be amended
to include persons accompanying the army in time of peace, but the legislature never
adopted this suggestion.
37. 39 STAT. 651 (1916).
38. The second Article, originally ART. or WaR 63, REv. STAT. § 1342 formerly read:
"All retainers to camp, and all persons serving with the armies of the United States in
the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to be subject to orders, according to the rules
and discipline of War."
39. In re Di Bartolo, 50 Fed. Supp. 929 (S. D. N. Y., 1943).
40. Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 (1879); Commonwealth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55
At]. 952 (1903); Grove v. Mott, 46 N. J. Law 328 (1884).
41. Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13 (1879) ; United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336 (U. S
1818).
42. Some authorities take issue with the above statement. The Articles of War guarantee
the same evidentiary safeguards which are insured by the civil courts in criminal prose-
cutions and further provide that the prosecutor must reveal whatever evidence he has
favorable to the defendant. (ARTICLES OF WAR, Art. 17-40, 41 STAT. 790-795, 10 U. S. C. A.
§ 1488-1511). However, the right to an indictment and a trial by jury is an inestimable
privilege, so precious to the defendant that the Constitutional exceptioh should be strictly
limited. See also Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
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Professor Glenn, 43 after quoting Raymond v. Thomas,44 states that the common
law should determine the jurisdictional limitation of the court martial.45 Therefore,
no crime should be tried by court martial unless it is clearly, unequivocally and
convincingly 46 shown that the accused is a member of the land or naval forces
within the meaning of the Constitution47 and that the crime committed affects the
discipline of the administration of the army.
48
Assuming that the court martial did not have jurisdiction herein, what judicial
tribunal was competent to try the relator? Obviously the courts in the continental
United States were not the proper tribunal, because the crime was committed without
the territorial limits of the United States, and not against the United States or
any of its agencies, and it is a well established rule of law that a crime is essentially
local and can be prosecuted and punished only in the sovereignty offended.49 In"
time of peace the civil courts of Eritrea would have exclusive jurisdiction over
the relator.50  It is conceded that if the instant crime had been committed by an
American citizen residing in Eritrea and not engaged in work connected with the
armed forces, the British Provost Court would have jurisdiction as the judicial
agency of the British military Government according to international law,51 but
the Provost Court denied its jurisdiction in the Bartolo case on the assumption
that the relator was subject to court martial by the American military authorities. 52
It is submitted that the British Provost Court and not the court martial had juris-
diction over the relator. Refusal by the competent court to exercise its jurisdiction
does not confer that right upon another court which ordinarily would not have
43. GLENN, THE Aiusy AND THE NAvy (Schiller's ed. 1943).
44. 91 U. S. 712, 716 (1875), wherein the court said: "It is an unbending rule of law
that the exercise ?f military power, where the rights of the citfien are concerned, shall
never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires."
45. GLENN, op. cit. supra note 43, at 176.
46. "With the known hostility of the American people to any interference by the military
with the regular administration of justice in the civil courts, no such intention should be
ascribed to Congress in the absence of clear and direct language." Coleman v. Tennessee,
97 U. S. 509, 514 (1878).
47. Art. 1, § 8, cI. 14, U. S. CoNsT. has never been construed as to the limitation upon
Congress' power to include civilians under military law. It would seem that Glenn's
"common law rule of construction" would apply. See supra, p. 000. Blackstone maintains
that a jury trial ought to be given in all cases except those of evident necessity (4 BLAcx-
sTrow's CoinsENTAmius 260) and such was the law of England at the time our Federal
Constitution was adopted. People ex te'. Blue v. Karney, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 916, 962
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
48. Manley v. People, 7 N. Y. 295 (1852); People v. Gardner, 2 Johns. 477 (N. Y.
1807).
49. Wmsox, INTENATioNAL LAW (3d ed. 1943) 131.
50. Id. at 307-312.
51. The British and American commanding officers agreed to exclude those persons sub-
ject to court martial under the military law of the United States from the jurisdiction of
the British Provost Court.
52. In re DiBartolo, 50 Fed. Supp. 929, 931 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). See also supra p. 127.
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jurisdiction, 53 since the crime committed did not offend that jurisdiction. 54t
TAXATION-NON-RESIDENT ALIEN---INCOME FROM LIQUIDATION OF A DOMESTIC
CORPORATION.-The taxpayer, a wealthy individual, resident of California, was in
poor health, and became alarmed by a possibility that in the event of his death
the bulk of his wealth would be lost through estate and income taxes. Most of his
assets, which were kept in a liquid condition, were held by his wholly owned corpo-
ration, organized many years prior under California law. A plan was evoked to
avoid this possibility, and in accordance with the plan, in 1937 this individual ex-
patriated himself by taking the oath of allegiance to the King of England, in Canada.
Shortly thereafter he took up residence in Nassau, the Bahamas and organized a
Bahamas corporation, whose entire capital stock was issued to him in return for
thi stock of the California corporation. Some four months later, the Bahamas
corporation caused the California corporation to be liquidated, by action of its
board of directors meeting in Nassau. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
asserted that the individual realized a gain of $2,459,083.00 on the liquidation of
the California corporation, and asserted an income tax deficiency of $487,093.20.
Held, deficiency affirmed. Hay v. Commissioner of Internal Reveme, 2 T. C. (1943).
In its decision, the court specifically was required to rule upon two interesting
issues: should the separate entity of the foreign corporation' be disregarded in
determining income tax liability; if so, did the amounts distributed in liquidation
by the domestic corporation 2 constitute income from sources within the United States.
It appears that this latter point constitutes a question of original impression.
The language of the applicable sections of the statute is at least somewhat contra-
dictory in its implications. Under the statute, only income from sources within the
United States is subject to the income tax in the case of a non-resident alien
individual.3 The statute provides generally that dividends from a domestic corpo-
53. If A commits a crime in the State of New York and the authorities in that state
refuse to prosecute him, the courts of no other state can try and punish the offender for
that crime. People v. Werblow, 241 N. Y. 55, 65, 66, 148 N. E. 786 (1925).
54. State v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052 (1918) ; Commonwealth v. Uprichard,
3 Gray 434 (Mass. 1855).
t A line of reasoning similar to the one promulgated in this article was followed in
Simkins v. Elmhurst Construction Co., N. Y. L. J., January 22, 1944, p. 285, col. 6,
where the plaintiff was employed on a similar basis as Bartolo in the principal case and
the court said: "Despite the nature of the work done by the defendant, and despite the
very close supervision over its activities by the government, including approval by the
government officers of the defendant's employees as a prerequisite of their employment,
the relationship of employer and employee subsisted, and the defendant is answerable for
the normal consequences of that relationship. The added fact that the contract was upon
a cost-plus basis cannot effect the situation." See also Curry v. United States, 314 U. S.
14, 62 Sup. Ct. 48 (1941); United States v. Driscoll, 96'U. S. 421 (1877); McCune v. Kil-
patrick, 53 Fed. Supp. 80, 83-87 (E. D. Va. 1943).
1. The Colonial Trust Co., Ltd., a Bahamas Corporation organized by William C. Hay.
2. William C. Hay, Ltd., a California corporation.
3. Section 212 (a) Internal Revenue Code, 53 STAT. 76, 26 U. S. C. A. § 212 (a) (1939).
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ration constitute income from sources within the United States, 4 and further pro-
vides that inc6me from the exchange of personal property outside the United States
is not income from a source within the United States.5 In the case of liquidating
distributions "amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be
treated as in full payment in exchange for the stocks .... 6
It was argued for the petitioner, that the liquidation of the domestic corporation
must be treated as an exchange under the statute, 7 and that since the resolution of
its board of directors to liquidate the domestic corporation and distribute its assets
was passed in Nassau, and the checks in distribution of the assets8 were drawn in
Nassau, that the liquidating exchange took place outside the United States and
thus did not give rise to income taxable to a non-resident alien. This argument
was rejected by the court which construed the above quoted language of the Internal
Revenue Code as affecting only the comptitation of the profit or loss in the trans-
action,0 and not as a legislative pronouncement that a complete liquidation shall
be deemed an exchange. An exchange contemplates a bi-partite transaction, whereas
a liquidation of a corporation is basically the, unilateral act of the corporation.10
It is in contemplation of law a strictly c6rporate act, not of any agent or. officer
who executes its mechanics, but of the corporate entity itself, and the corporate
entity has existence only in the place of its creation." In holding as it did, the
Section 211 Internal Revenue Code, 56 STAT. 807, 861, 875, 26 U. S. C. A. § 211 (1942)
provides for a division of non-resident aliens into two classes for income tax purposes;
those who have and, those who have not a United States business or office, with certain
differences in the methods of determining tax liability. In the instant case, the taxpayer
expressly waived the provisions applicable t6 non-resident aliens having no United States
business or office.
4. Section 119 (a) (2) Internal Revenue Code, 53 STAT. 53, 26 U. S. C. A. § 119 (a) (2)
(1939).
5. Section 119 (e) Internal Revenue Code, 3 STAT. 53, 26 U. S. C. A. § 119 (e) '(1939);
italics added.
6. Section 115 (c) Internal Revenue Code, 53 STAT. 46, 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (c) (1939);
italics added.
7. Section 115 (c) Internal Revenue Code, 53 STAT. 46, 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (c) (1939).
8. At the date of liquidation the assets of the William C. Hay, Ltd., the domestic
corporation, consisted of about $2,000,000 of cash in Canadian and United States banks,
and certain comparatively minor holdings of stocks of domestic corporations. Certificates
for the shares of stock were reissued in the name of the Colonial Trust Co., Ltd., the
foreign corporation, and checks for the full balance of each were drawn in Nassau to
the Colonial Trust Co., Ltd., and mailed to the Bank of Nova Scotia, Montreal, Canada,
for deposit to Colonial's accounts.
9. Since gain or loss on complete liquidation is treated as in exchange for the stock,
the capital gains tax provisions, of § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code, 56 STAT. 844-847,
26 U. S. C. A. § 117 (1942) also apply.
10. A distribution in complete liquidation may be paid although the shareholders con-
tinue to hold their stock certificates. Frelmont Realty Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 29 B. T. A. 181, 189 (1933).
11. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588 (U. S. 1839). The opinion in the cited.
case points -out that other jurisdictions may through comity recognize the corporate
existence.
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reasoning of the court is logically sound since it would be an anomaly to hold that
the accumulated profits and gains of an American corporation derived from its
business in the United States, are not income from within the United States, when
realized by the stockholder through distribution of the assets in liquidation.' 2 Yet
it would appear that the statute itself is not so logically strict in its definition of
income from sources within the United States as this interpretation holds, since
income from the sale of personal property outside the United States is deemed,
under the statute, to have been realized where the sale is made, although it is
readily conceivable that the appreciation in value may have been due solely to
factors within the United States.13
In order to charge the petitioner here with any tax liability, however, it was
necessary to establish that the legal entity of the foreign corporation could be
disregarded for taxing purposes. Unless that could be done, no income taxable by
the United States would arise from the liquidation, since even conceding the con-
clusion reached by the court that gain from liquidating dividends is income from
sources within the United States, in the case of the foreign corporation the method
of computation provided by the statute would disclose no gain.14 The exchange
of the stock of the domestic corporation for the stock of the foreign corporation
by the petitioner would not give rise to taxable income since the exchange was
made at Nassau, outside the United States.15
The principles determining when a corporate entity, formed for the purpose of
avoiding or reducing tax liability and having no other business purpose, should be
disregarded were first set forth with primary authority in the case of Gregory v.
Helvering.'6 There, in letter-perfect compliance with the terms of the statute, a
corporation, was formed and had a life of six days, for the sole purpose of passing
property from a corporation to its sole stockholder through the guise of a reorgani-
zation, thereby substantially reducing tax liability. In holding that the corporate
entity should be disregarded the court stated: "The whole undertaking though con-
12. "Plainly the payment in question constitutes income derived from a source within
the United States, and the natural aim of Congress will be to reach it." Helvering v.
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 89, 55 Sup. Ct. 50 (1934).
13. Section 119 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code, 53 STAT. 53, 26 U. S. C. A. § 119 (e)
(1939).
14. The basis of the domestic corporation's stock in the hands of the foreign corporation
would be its fair market value on August 6, 1937, the date it was acquired as the con-
sideration for the issuance of Colonial's stock. Section 113 (a) Internal Revenue Code, 53
STAT. 872, 26 U. S. C. A. § 113 (a) (1939)..Since Colonial was a foreign corporation,
§ 112 (i) Internal Revenue Code, 53 STAT. 870, 26 U. S. C. A. § 112 (i) (1939) served
to prevent the operations of the provisions of subsection (b) (5) 53 STAT. 870 (1939)
providing for non-recognition of gain or loss in the transfer of property to a corporation
controlled by the transferor. The assets of the domestic corporation consisted almost
solely of cash in banks, with only nominal changes between the date of acquisition of the
stock by the foreign corporation. and the liquidation four months later; thus the amount
received on liquidation would necessarily be substantially the same as the value four
months earlier.
15. Section 119 (e) Internal Revenue Code, 53 STAT. 53, 26 U. S. C. A. § 119 (e) (1939).
16. 293 U. S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266 (1935).
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ducted according to the terms of subdivision (B) was in fact an elaborate and
devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and
nothing else."' 7 This holding was expanded in Griffiths v. Helvering,'8 where a
corporation was created to defer the reporting of a substantial sum as income.
The court ruled against the taxpayer and quoted with vigorous approval from
earlier decisions involving sham or unreality.19 In Higgins v. Smith,20 the court
indicates its view of the principle underlying the decision in Gregory v. Helvering2'
in the following language: "If ... the Gregory case is viewed as a precedent for
the disregard of a transfer of assets without a business purpose but solely to reduce
tax liability, it gives support to the natural conclusion that transactions, which do
not vary, control or charge the flow of economic benefits, are to be dismissed from
consideration." 22 The opinion in the Smith case goes further, and states that the
taxing authority may examine the form employed for doing business or carrying
out the challenged tax event, and upon determination that it is a sham may sustain
or disregard the fiction of corporate entity as best serves the tax statute 23
So broad a discretionary authority in the taxing body required a definition as
to when a corporation has business purpose. The Supreme Court, in the recent
case of Moline Properties Inc. v. Commissioner,24 stated that if the purpose is "to
serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose
is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business
by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate tax entity." The mere
purpose to avoid taxes does not constitute a sufficient business purpose. In the
principal case it was asserted that the action of the foreign corporation in holding
$2,000,000 of cash for five years awaiting a favorable opportunity. to put it to
work earning a return with a minimum of risk did constitute a business activity.
This argument was rejected, and it would appear that the decision of the court
was entirely proper on this point, and well within the much broader rule established
in Higgins v. Commissioner,25 that no matter how large the estate or how con-
tinuous or extended the work required may be, the mere managerial attention to
investments and the maintenance of records of, and collection of, interest and
17. 293 U. S. 465, 470, 55 Sup. Ct. 266 (1935).
18. 308 U. S. 355, 60 Sup. Ct. 277 (1939).
19. "We cannot too often reiterate that 'taxation is not so much concerned with the
refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual
benefit from which the tax is paid.' Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S 376, 378 [50 Sup. Ct. 336
(1930) ]. And it makes no difference that such 'command' may be exercised through specific
retention of legal title or the creation of a new equitable but controlled interest, or the
maintenance of effective benefit through the interposition of a subservient agency ....
Taxes cannot be escaped 'by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully
devised ... by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which
they grew.' Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 115 [50 Sup. Ct. 281 (1930)]" Griffiths v.
Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355, 35"7; 60 Sup. Ct. 277 (1939).
20. 308 U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940).
21. 293 U. S. 465, 55 Sup. Ct. 266 (1935).
22. 308 U. S. 473, 476, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940).
23. 308 U. S. 473, 477, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940).
24. 319 U. S. 436, 439, 63 Sup. Ct. 1132 (1943).
25: 312 U. S. 212, 61 Sup. Ct. 415 (1941).
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